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llJDW ARD R.. BAIRD, JR., Appellant, 
'l,ersus 
NELLE S. TYLER, ET AL., Appellees. 
PETITION FOR AN APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Oo,u,rt of ..d.ppeals 
of Virginia: · · · 
Edward H. Baird, Jr., petitioner, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by a final decree of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk (H9n. Clyde H. Jacob), entered March 
30, 1945 (R., p. 46), whereby the White :M:arsh Club, a cor-
porate party defendant, was declared dissolved and its assets 
ordered sold at public auction. That decree, and the order 
entered February 21, 1945, overruling the moti~i;i for a stay, 
are assigned as error., and an appeal from them is prayed 
for: 
Petitioner will sometimes be referred-to· herein as respond-
ent, when his position in that capacity is significant to the. 
context of this petition. Appellee will be called complainant.a, 
as. they were in the trial court. 
A transcript of the record is filed herewith and referred 
to herein. If an appeal is allowed, this petition is adopted as. 
an opening brief. A copy of it was delivered to opposing 
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counsel on M:ay 11, 1945. Opportunity for oral argument is 
requested. This petition will be filed with Justice John W. 
Eggles~on at his office in the City of Norfolk. 
2* ~STATEMENT. 
This .is a chancery suit to dissolve a corporation. The cor-
poration is a non-stock company, the White Marsh Club, 
formed for the purpose of hunting ducks in Back Bay, Prin- · 
cess Anne County. The bill alleg·es that there were three 
charter members, that two of them have died, and that "witl1 
the death of two of the three members of the White :M:arsb 
Club the purpose for which this corporation was forined has 
completely failed'' (paragraph 5 of Bill of Complaint, R., 
p. 6). · The prayer is for a dissolution under Code section 
3880. 
Appellant's answer .denied that there had been a dissolu-
tion in fact: alleged that, on the contrary, there were two 
living members who were actually operating the club during 
the pendency of the suit. The demurrer and amended answer 
resisted the theory of technical di~solntion by operation of 
the mere death of a member, and attached as exhibits copies 
of the by-laws and minutes t,f demonstrate that it was both 
possible and feasible to carr: on the corporation with two 
members. 
Up until the hearing on the :merits,· that was the only issue. 
Then, however, the proof went off on a wide tangent. Com-
plainants' evidence (Stipulation, R., pp. 44-5) switehed to a 
theory that there were two members who were very much 
alive and "kicking". In F:hort, they abandoned the death 
ground and shifted to the proposition that, because of alleged 
disputes with one of the two members, there was a complete 
corporate collapse. Appellant objected to the admissibility 
of their meager evidence on the point, but the court indulged 
in an assumption that the disputes had something to do with 
operating the club, and entered the desired decree of disso-
lution. 
There are other, side issues. They are all set forth below, 
in chronological sequence. 
3* ""ERRORS ASSIGNED. 
1. The court erred in overruling- the motion- for a stay un-
der the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act. 
2. The court erred in overruling appellant's demurrer. 
3. The court erred in overruling appellant's objections to 
the evidence. 
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4. The court erred in holding that complainants' evidence, 
even if. admissible, was sufficient ground for or proof of dis-
solution. 
5. The court erred in refusing to ref ~r the case to a com-
missioner on the question of whether the property wa·s sus., 
ceptible to partition or division in ~ind. ... . 
The errors assigned will be dealt with in this petition in 
the order of their importance, as hereinafter noted. Before 
doing so, however, it is more appropriate to discuss the issue 
made up on the pleadings. That issue, while virtually ignored 
by the court below, is, we submit, the decisive point in the 
whole case and governs practical1y all of the other questions 
presented on this- appeal. Therefore it is assigned as an ad-
ditional error relied upon by petitioner. 
THE BILL AND ANSWER. 
The bill of. complaint plainly. and exclusively founds the 
complainants' right to relief on the death of two of the three 
charter members. It alleges with admirable particularity 
that because two of .the members were dead, and only one sur-
vived, the purpose of the corporation had failed. · 
Petitioner's answer was responsive to the bill, with' equal . 
particularity. It first set up the fact that petitioner was a 
member (by virtue of transfer of membership from his 
father) and thus that there were two living members instea,d 
of one. .Against a background of facts alleged for the 
4 * *purpose of showing the remarkable improvement in duck 
shooting in Back Bay ( and consequent value of the club 
properties)., it then went on to 11oint out that the club had 
continued to operate as usual after each charter m~mber's 
death occurred. It further alleged that less than two months 
before the. suit was instituted (in September), all of the cus-
tomary preparations were under way to· enjoy the coming 
season (in November). Prior to this time, the thought of 
dissolution was unheard of. In other _words, complete har-
mony prevailed. 
These facts were fully supported by the testimony ( Stipu-
lation, R., pp. 44-5) and went uncontested and undenied. This 
court may therefore well wonder what cataclysmic catas-
trophe suddenly overwhelmed the corporation, to frustrate its 
charter purposes and render further hunting impossible at· 
the White Marsh Club. 
The answer explains this by referring to an alleged mis-
understanding over a dog. Precisely one week -after the dog 
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incident arose, it · alleges, petitioner received a request to 
agree to a public auction of th~ club properties. Even then 
the subject of failure of purposes or dissolution had not come 
up (R., pp. 38-9). · It was not until suit was threatened, and 
inquiry made as to the cause or ground for suit, that peti-
tioner wa$ advised that anybody's death was supposed to 
affect the corporate entity. Hence the court will see that the 
undenied characterization ·of the ground of suit as ~ubterfuge. 
and afterthought,. was not lightly pleaded. 
Since the facts· above related (which are taken from the an-
swer and the proof in support thereof) were riot and co-µld 
not be denied, the principal portion of this argument will be 
devoted to the clean-cut proposition of law, namely, whether 
the death of one of three members of a non-stock corporate 
club must defeat its lawful existence, contrary to the 
5~ wishes of one •of the two members and contrary to the 
fact of existence and actual operation. 
Whjle the bill claims that two of the members are dead, the 
answer, the proof and the court's decree establish that only 
. one member passed away. This was because Mr. Edward 
R. Baird, Sr., had given his membership to llis son, the peti-
tioner, prior to his death. Therefore we t)roceed at the thres-
hold on the proposition that complainants' alleged ground of 
, dissolution is cut in half: one, not two, members are dead, 
and two members, not one, are living·. Mrs. Tyler's rights~ 
as the widow and devisee of Major S. Reth Tyler, the de-
ceased member, are the subject of later comment in this peti-
tion. · 
In preliminary, our petition should be frank to admit that 
we do not know whether Judge Jacob decided this issue, or 
whether complainants' counsel will ,wen rely on it. From 
tbe inf}troduction of evidence on a new and contradictory 
theory, we assume that it must have been abandoned. How-
ever, since this may be subject to debate, we a1:"e forced upon 
the dilemma of dealing with two wholly different and unre_. 
lated issues-one appearing exclusively in the pleadings (R., 
p. 6) and the other exclusively in the evidence (R., p. 45)-
on pain of ignoring whichever point complainants might now 
conceive lends the most s:npport to their judgment below. 
Devoting our attention to the pleadings: the statute under 
which this suit is claimed to be brought ( Code section 3880) 
provides the exclusive methods and reasons whereby a Vir-
ginia court can dissolve a non-stock corporation. One is 
.abandonment of the management; the other is failure of ''the 
principal objects and purposes for which it was formed". 
The statute says nothing about a voluntary or unanimous dis-
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solution, Moreover, Code ;;ection 3820a expressly ex-
6• empts non-stock companies from the privilege ,x,grante.d 
other corporations of selling all their assets., and thus go-
ing out of business, under a two-thirds majority vote. This 
peculiarity of a non-stock corporation is important here be-
cause under section 3876, the only thing that any amount of 
majority can do in the way of selling and disposing of assets 
of a non-stock corporation must be with a view to ''promot-
ing or advancing the necessary objects and purposes''. While 
no majority-versus-minority situation is involved in this 
case, the legal limitations upon the will of even a majority 
have a direct bearing on the objective which just one of the 
members of this corporation is here striving to accomplish 
through the medium of a court of equity. 
Before taking up the immediate question, a few general 
principles may be stated. 19 0. J., p. 1442, says: 
"A failure of purpose of the corporation, to be a sufficient 
ground for dissolution, must amount to impossibility of per-
formance of the purposes of the corporation, * * "". '' . 
Fletcher on Corporations, vol. 16, page 655: 
'' There is no dissolution, strictly speaking., unless the cor-
poration has lost all its power to continue or to resume its 
business as a ·going concern.'' _ 
Compare the above with the following thought f ouncl in the 
same Yolume of Fletcher on page 657: 
''Neither bankruptcy, nor cessation of business, nor dis-
persal of stockholders nor the absence of directors, nor all 
of these combined, without more, will 'avail to stifle the 
breath of a juristic personality. The corporation abides as 
an ideal creation, impervious to the shock of- these temporal 
vicissitudes' " ( quoting from Ba.nk v. Balflk, .253 N. Y. 23, 
170 N. E. 479). 
The foregoing may be couched in quaint language, but it. 
is amply expressive of t~e thought tllat the corporation is a 
personality independent of its memb~rs and lives on unless 
their lives and fortunes are such an integral part of the 
company as would bring about an absolute impossibility 
7'" •of performance of charter purposes without them. 
The only general statement of the law that has been 
found on the question of how the death of members affects 
non-stock corporations, is contained in Fletcher on Corpora_. 
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tions (1942 rev .. vol.), section 7993, at pag;e 691. No other 
authorities have been located which contradict this . state-
ment: 
"In the case of non-stock corporations, the death or with-
drawal of members mav leave the association in such a state 
as to be incapable of acting· or continuing itself. When that 
happens and too few members remain, under tbe co11stitution 
of the association, to continue the succession, and fill 
vacancies, a dissolution may resnlt. As a rule, however, such 
a corporation, is not dissolved by the death or withdrawal of 
its members, even thou .. gh it is left without members. Par-
ticularly is this frite where a .<;uf ficient nwmber of members re-
main to continue the s·uccession and fill itp the vacancies.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
Let us examine the White Marsh Club to determine whether 
there are '' a sufficient number of members to continue the 
succession and fill up the vacancies". In other words, is it 
pdssible or impossible for the Whit~ Marsh Club to continue Y 
An analysis of the by-laws shows tbat, by section 1 (R., p. 
42)., the board of directors is to consist of not less than three 
nor more than ten, elected by a majority of the members; a 
majority of the board is vrescribed as a quorum. The plead-
ings and proof in this case show that there are two directors 
legally holding office_:_Serpell and Baird. Being two in num-
ber, they constitute a quorum and can transact any necessary 
business. · · 
Section 7 of the by-laws stipulates that the officers and di-
rectors are elected for one year or until their successors are 
elected; any vacancy on the board by death or resigna.tion is· 
to be filled by the board itself. The record in this case shows 
that the board is thus in a position to fill the vacancy created 
by Major Tyler's death, whenever it sees fit. 
Section 9 of the by-laws deals with memberships. It 
s• sets up a class *''A'' membership and such other classes 
as may be determined by the board. The matter of elect-
hig members, fixing dues, etc., is left to regulations to be 
drawn up by the board from time to .time in the light of exist-
ing conditions. It also recites that two negative votes defeats 
election to membership. Class ''A'' members may vote., and 
'' transfer or otherwise dispose of their membership only to 
a, person who has been duly and ire,qularly elected to me1nber-
ship". · 
Major Tyler thus knew, when the club was org·anized, that 
his membership was not transferable, by cleath or otherwise, 
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without the consent of the club. This cond~tio~, according to 
the by-laws,, was to· have been printed plainly in the member ... 
ship certificates, when issued~ His death does not clepriv(> 
the company of its right or ability to grant or withhold that 
consent-or in any other way affect its mechanical conditi&n-
to do business. He simply dropped out, leaving· the club·'to) ,. 
continue. The interest, if any, which he left to his heit$ 
clearly did not entitle them to membership. The fact, ther-e-
fore, that Mrs. Tyler is not interested in shooting ducks at 
the club is beside the point--she has no right to. 
From the by-la~s as a whole, the court will see at a glance 
that there are- no l~gal or technical difficulties in the way o.f 
electing new members whenever it so desires. It is a perfectly 
'' going concern''; there is nothing to suggest that it is im-
possible for the corporation to proceed with its charter pur-
poses with two members and directors, any more or less than 
it could with three members and directors. In short, the 
White Marsh Club is just as able to carry on now, as jt was 
when it was incorporated. 
The foregoing is more or less a point of law. But what do 
the facts show? Complainants' testimony that they $lo not 
desire to shoot, all too plainly implies that they can shoot 
9* and can use and operate the club. The *fact of the mat-
ter is that complaint Serpel] did so, in conjunction with 
the respondent, during the Yery pendency of suit, just as they 
had always done in past years at the White· Marsh Club (R., 
p. 38). The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the cor-
poration is '' duly organized and existing under and hy virtue 
of the laws of the State of Virginia''. 
There was some assertion in the trial argument that the club 
was formed exclusively for the personal benefit of· the three 
charter members ·and that, because two of them (Messrs. 
Heth Tyler and Edward R. Baird, Sr.) had passed on, com.;. 
plainant Serpell could not shoot by himself and the corporate 
purposes were thereby defeated. 
· The Supreme Court of A.ppeals· will rMollect that both 
Messrs. Baird and Tyler, prominent attorneys at the ap-
pellate bar, were men of advanced age when this company 
was chartered in 1937. Yet thev executed a- certificate de-
scribing the eiistence of the chib as ''unlimited". And it 
will not take more than a cursory inspection of the by-laws 
to. perceive that it was the expectation of the incorporators to 
elect more members ( class ''A'' or otherwise) and operate 
a sizeable club as soon as the hunting improved. The agreed 
succes·sion of petitioner to his father's membership fits in with 
this picture and refutes in itself the palpably litigation-
8. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
minded argument that complainants' counsel's father, and 
petitioner's father, did not expect them -to step into their . 
shoes and continue to enjoy the hunting long after they were 
gone. If this were not the fact, it would ind~ed be peculiar 
for the club to operate along for two hunting seasons subse-
quent to Major Tyl~r's death, and then come to a sudden 
halt for some _totally unrelated reason such as has been de-
creed in this case. Two of the incorporators were lawyers of 
ability and disth;iction, and it can hardly be argued that they 
did not know the difference between a corporation and a part-
nership. . . . · 
10* *On the pleadings, therefore~ the issue must be de-
cided against' the complainants. It is almost unthink-
able, we submit, that a corporation composed of three indi-
viduals becomes dissolved willy-nilly upon the death of one 
of them. Perhaps a belated recognition of the handwriting 
on the wall to this effect, was what caused complainants at 
the la~t minute to abandon the point, as will hereinafter ap-
pear. 
THE DEMURRER. 
The principal ground of demurrer having been incorporated 
into the answer by way of amendment {because of objection 
to technical form), we will here deal only with the ground 
relating to Mrs. Nelle S. Tyler. Our objections to her testi-
mony in the stipulation are pertinent in this connection. 
The bill of complaint; if the court will observe, alleges that 
she is not a member, and Judg;e Jacob so held. The point is 
made by demurrer that Mrs. Tyler has no standing in court 
to demand dissolution. Not being a m~mber, she obviously 
has no more right to participate in this proceeding than she 
has to participate in a meeting and vote for a ~ale of assets. 
In order to make the point abundantly plain, we refer to Code 
section 3880 (under which we are asked to proceed), which 
provides that the only persons who can maintain a suit for 
dissolution of a non-atock corporatiqn are creditors or '' one-
fifth in number of the active (sic.} mem.bers of such corpora- , 
tion". Mrs. T-yler, of course., does not profess to be either 
active or inactive. She, being· '' an individual· cannot sue to 
dissolve a corporation" (Fletcher on Corporations, section 
8087). 
The proposition is self-evident that Mrs. Tyler.'s wishes in 
the matter of shooting or dissolving are no more to be con-
sidered than those of any stranger to whom either Ser-
11• pell or Baird might attempt to transfer his •member-
ship without the consent of the other. The mntter is of 
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some moment because it demonstrates that this suit.is not a 
three-cornered affair. It is strictly between Serpell and 
Baird and involves Serpell 's and }3aird 's rights, and not the 
Tyler~s. If this were not so, the court would be putting the 
in.embers of eyery oorporate club in a position of being $1lbject 
to ejection, through dissolution proceedings, by person~ who 
were not even claimed to be members. 
Further comment relative to Mrs. Tyler's· rig·hts in this 
matter will be found und~:r the heading dealing with a p~rti-
tion of the property. -
OBJECTIONS TO THE EVIDENCE. 
An examination of the pleadings will diaclose beyond per .. 
adventure that petitioller met and answered every charge 
laid again.st him or the club as a separate entity. His uncon-
tested answer being fully supported by proof and entireJy 
reaponi;;ive to the bill, it is difficult to $ee .how the appellate 
coui·t can do other than dismiss the suit. No procedural 
weans yet being de,rised in Virgfaia for a respondent to file 
an answer to evidence, th~ cas~ on the merits muat stand or 
f ~ll, first, on the objections to the evid<;nce, and last, on the 
sufficiency ,of such evidence a.s was admissible. 
If this court will, for a moment, place .itself in the position 
of defense counsel, and examine the bill of complaint, it will 
see that for five months ( from October through February) 
the l·espondent was confronted with a clean-cut singular cause 
of action. That was, whether the death of one ( or two) mem .. 
hers of his club had the effect of dissolving the corporation, 
What other issue should de:f ense counsel have prepared him• 
self to meet on ·the merits Y To pnt the question another way 
around, should preparations have been made to meet the dis-
pute issuef If so, how on earth could~ounsel be held to have 
anticinated such an issue? That q1;1estion, we submit, 
12* ca·nnot be answered in ~-the fac.e of these pleading·s. 
Yet at the hearing, evidence was quickly admitted that 
did not have anything to do with the pleadings, and an oral 
decision announced on the same day. In less than on hour's 
time the case went off on a brand new, unheard of l1ypothesis. 
In passing on the objections to the evidence, Judge Jacob 
seemed to think that any evidence could be introduced tending 
to prove a failure of corporate purposes, so long as complain-
ants had alleged that the purposes had failed. But he evi-
dently did not stop to thu1k that a failure of corporate pur-
poses could come about for a dozen different :rea$ons. For 
instance, the most obvious would be a complete dearth of 
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ducks~ or ammunition, such as to make hunting impossible. 
Another time-worn ground for failure of corporate purposes 
is insolvency. vV e could continue suggesting many other 
widely divergent grounds, but enough have already been cited 
to demonstrate that a bill which specified no gr_o·und under a· 
general allegation of failure of purposes, would unquestion~ 
ably be objectionable for lack of particularity and uncertainty. 
However all of this may be, we need not consider the point 
in the case before us, for the reason that a very specific 
ground is set up and alleged in the bill of complaint, to the 
evident exclusion of all others. There was no '' general is-
sue'' in this case; the bill _focused entire attention on the con-
secutive deaths of two of the three charter members, as the 
sole cause of action. 
If it is not inconsistent to allege that a club is dissolved 
because it only has one member, and then at the trial proceed 
011 a theory that there are two members who do not want to 
shoot with each other, it would be difficult to conceive of a 
m01·e surprising situation .with which a defendant could be 
confronted in court. If it is not substituting an entirely 
13* new cause of *action to plead 'death and prove life, then 
the rules of pleading and centuries of decisions simply 
cannot mean what they say. If a respondent is ,to be thus 
deprived of bis right to plead, and his right to make up and 
define ;;in issue or issues, on the pleadings before trial, we 
might just as well do away with all processes and notices to 
appear. On the basis of Judge ,Tacol)'s decision, any defend-
ant who appears in his court must either find it useless to pre-
pare for trial, or he must prepare in extenso for every con-
ceivable set of circumstances that could possibly have some-
thing to do with the broad g·eneral subject matter of suit. We 
are not stretching the imagination in saying· that his decision 
on this point must mean that, if a personal injury suit is 
brought in the Circuit Court for a broken jaw sustained in an 
alleged traffic accident, a plaintiff could produce testimony at 
the trial to sl1ow that his jaw was broken in a personal en-
counter with fisticuffs. -
In the case before us, we ask the court to take distinct note 
tbat the second set of circumstances ( that is, the circum-
stances attempted to be proved) was eliminated as an impos-
sibility by the first set of circumstances (the circumstances 
set up in the bill):. the complainants orig·inally denied that 
petitioner was a member and claimed Serpell to be the sole 
survivor; therefore, if there was only one member, a ground 
based upon circumstances presupposing the contrary (such 
as a dispute, or disagreement over operations) could not, con-
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ceivably, have been advanced in the face of the pleadings a~ 
they stood, and still stand. We go so far as to suggest· 'that 
the recitals in the bill, excluding petitioner from membership, 
were drawn with the ·original design of foreclosing his antici-
pated contention that the suit was brought out of a· spirit 
of petty revenge over the dog incident. If petitioner .were 
not a· member, it follows that he wouJd hav~ no ri-ght to 
14.. question the motives *of suit, much· less contest the 
grounds of dissolution. If he were an outsider., like 
Mrs. Tyler, then the way would be cleared for a "unanimoi1s'' 
or uncontested dissolution .by Serpell as the sole st~rviviJ>:g 
member. When petitioner's answer was filed, liowever, and 
the concept of Serpell's absolute dominion and control over 
the situation was dispelled, it obviously became necessary for 
complainants to take a different tack if they wanted to rescue 
their litig·ation. 
We wish to make this point abundantly plain because it 
demonstrates that complainants' proof sets up matter foretgn 
to the bill, in a last-minute effort to straddle the answer~ It 
accepts the defense all~gation that petitioner is a member, 
but seeks to set up matter in avoidance of the consequences 
by claiming that because something happened further and 
beyond Major Tyler's death, there should still be a dissolu-
tion for yet another reason, namely, the so-called dispute rea-
son. Clearly this is a hot and cold breath on petitioner's 
defense to the original pleading. We submit that by their 
allegations in the bill, complainants nailed themselves to the 
cross of dissolution by reason of death, and could not have 
amended their bill (had they persisted in trying) so as to 
make out a new case for dissolution--via the avenue of dis-
pute. While we do not suppose that the equitable doctrine of 
waiver and estoppel can be strictly applied to a point of evi-
dence, complainants' misleading tactics certainly contain all 
qf the elements of the doctrine in this situation. Pleadings 
are supposed to eliminate guesswork; there is no legal 
legerdemain which will ever justify the devious practice of 
pleading one thing and proving another . 
. ·By neglecting to plead the cause of action upon which the 
case was adjudicated, complainants forced upon respondent 
the dilemma of deciding_, in the midst of the hearing, 
15'* whether the cause of action set up in the bill •of com-
plaint had been abandoned, whether he should depart 
from his position of reliance on the responsiveness and suf-
ficiency of his answer, whether he sl10uld waive his objections 
to the evidence, waive his right. to be confronted with and 
plead to a separate and distinct cause ·of action, and then 
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be led off on a chase of testimony: concerning something so 
inadequately presented as to invite misunderstanding, con .. 
fusion and the possibility of endless other new and belatedly 
conceived grounds of suit. No matter how valid respond-
ent's de_fense to the dispute claim, no matter how tempting 
the opportunity to squelch it1 the fact remained that a dispute 
was the very antithesis of what was specified and implied in 
the written allegations; that even as proved the disp,1tes had 
no connection with corporate pnrposea or operation; and that 
counsel's. sudden about-face in procedure was cause for ex-
treme suspicion. · 
We leave counsel to explain wby the allega.tion~ of his· bill 
were not framed in the alternative. Having specifically plead 
one ground for di~solution, it might interest the court to know 
why.th~ other ground was withheld. from his bill of complaint. 
There must be some explanation for bis motive in thus em-
phaijizing a weaker ground and suppressing a stronger, un-
less of course the·" dispute" angle was forgotten or discarded 
when the bill was prepared. 
INSUFFICIENCY ffE' THE EVIDENCE. 
We think that the evidence, even if admissible, is utterly 
insufficient to justify any such step as dissolving a corpora-
tion. There is quoted below t]1e entire testimony introduced 
by the c;omplainants in this cause (Stipulation, R., p. 45) : 
(1) "That if Nelle S. Tyler were present and te~tifying, 
she would testify that she was not interested in shooting 
waterfowl and that sh~· desired the dissolution of the White 
· M&rsh Club. Objection by respondent, etc., etc. 
16• *(2) ''That if Goldsborough Serpell were present and· 
testifying, he would testify that due to disputes with 
Edward R. Baird, Jr., he does not desire to shoot waterfowl 
with the said Edward R. Bai;rd, J :r. Objection by respon~ 
ent, etc., etc. · 
(3) "(Relating to respondent's evidence). 
( 4) "That the fore going stip'llla.tion con.c;titute., the sole 
evidence introdluced. 011id attem.pfor]. fo be introduqeil in th-is 
cause, • * • .. '' 
In sum and substance, it will be seen that the foregoing 
~vidence ~t most puts forward only one thing; a desire not 
to shoot. The reason or motive ·prompting the claimed dis .. 
inclination, is e:x;plained by a passing reference to i' disputes'' 
with the respondent. Strief note ought to be made of the fact 
that no disputes are said to exist between Serpell and Baird,. 
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the two members. The highly equiv-0cal expi:.ession, ''due to 
disputes. with Baird'', is employed. Counsel well knows which 
personalities were involved in the dog incident. But, for that . 
matter, the dispute is not even claimed to be about the dog. 
It is, in fact, not claimed to be abo·ut anything. The testimony 
i ... c; si1nply advarnced that" disputes".,with Baird exi .. st. So far 
as the record discloses, the disputes might have related to the 
dog incident, or they might have related to subjects, let us 
im8.ooine, such as shooting rules, membersl1ip rules, or a fuss 
over installing an elevator in the one-story clubhouse. The 
only way that a person examining this record can tell what 
the so-called disputes were about, is by reading· between the 
lines and connecting them with the only other bit of evidence 
in the case approaching in nature a dispute-the '' alleged 
misunderstanding over a dog" (.Answer, R.., p. 38). The rec-
ord is absolutely bare of the remotest scrap or comma of evi-
dence tending to support the recital in the final decree that 
the_ "disputes" had something to do with corporate purposes 
or operations, much Jess rendered them -impossible of 
17'* accomplishment. We do not exceed the bounds of #fair 
criticism in saying tba t the final decree; in this respect, 
was drawn from the thin air. . 
It is apt to strike this court as curious, to . say the least, 
why the complainants, in their considered wisdom, refrainec;l 
from elaborating upon tho so-called disputes. A dispute, as 
such, is a conclusion or mere characterization, not. a fact. 
There is no claim that they were lasting. disputes, as dis-
tinguished from trivial ones. Nor 1s there any reference to 
whether they were mere personal disputes, ·or disagreements 
over what should or should not have been done with the club. 
Time, place and circumstances are lacking. No explanation 
is advanced to. demonstrate any connection or relation to tbe 
charter purposes. Likewise, the cause of the disputes is not 
assigned, and certainly there is 1nothing to imply or inf er that 
Baird was. responsible for the claimed disputes. There is 
similarly a failure to prove that such disputes or differences 
exist between Serpell and Baird as are impossible of so1ution 
after due recourse to proper proceedings within the corpora-
tion has been had. All of these matters are common-sense· 
requirements-in a charge of this nature, but the four corners 
of the record leave them untouched. The absence., however, 
of eitber allegation or proof on the foregoing matters does . 
not strike the petitioner as curious, Rincc he was well pre-
pared to expose any claims as .to them. No demurrer was 
or could have been filed; otherwise, our objections to the suf-
ficiency of the claimed disputes would be found a m~tter of 
formal record. 
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The left-handed insinuation of ''disputes.'', without more, 
as justification for a sudden desire to dissolve, is no proof of 
. anything. ·without a showing that ~ome trouble, some factor, 
has arisen whereby the functioning of the· club is actually in-. 
terrupted and rendered impossible-not only in a business 
· way but in .the pursuit of charter purposes--no court 
18~ can begin to dissolve a *corporation under the failure-
of-purpose premise. Especially and conclusively is this. 
proposition to be accepted when the record before the court 
establishes that the club is actually operating and the mem-
bers are actually enjoying the hunting during· the very pen-. 
dency of suit (R.., pp. 38-9). Judici31 notice will be taken 
that the past duck season extended from November 2, 1944, 
to January 20, 1945. It is not merely coincidence, the ref ore, 
that this suit was virtually held in abeyance for four months 
until February,, and· then suddenly pressed to a ·conclusion; 
the only reason we can assign is the logically obvious one that 
complainant Serpell and, his counsel were anxious to keep the 
litigation from interfering with tl}eir aim. The situation is 
somewhat suggestive of the prompt action of the Nevada 
court in throwing out a divorce case 'when it discovered that . 
the parties were living tog-ether in Reno during the proceed-
ings. Complainant Serpell, by seeking to use and dissolve 
the club at one and the sanlfl timE', is deep in the predicament 
of the proverbial keeper of the cake whose. appetite outran 
his discretion. Rather than attempt to prove that the so-
called disputes interrupted operations or interfered with 
shooting, he has elected \o '' go to bat'' on a record which 
shows just the contrary. 
We may expect to hear a mild dissertation from the other 
side, as. to the .state of the law relative to disagreements over 
operating business corporations reac.hing such an impasse 
that the conduct of business llas become no longer possible. 
Suffice it to say that a line of authorities to that general ef-
fect is recognized, but they do not and could not ref er to 
unexplained ''disputes' 7 involving one member, and more-
over they do not and could not mean that any dispute works 
a dissolution, unless it is alleged and proved to frustrate in 
'reality the attainment of the charter purposes. 
·wherein does this record contain anything to. establish an 
impossibility of shooting ducks or holding meetings or 
.. 19~ transacting business in the White *Marsh Club t True, 
Serpell may not pref er to shoot or hold a meeting or 
transact business with Baird, and vice versa·, but wherefore 
does such become impossibl~? Applying the old adage, ''If 
wishes were horses, beggars could ride", it does not take a 
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great deal of discernment .to perceive that Serpell cannot. 
''ride'' in this suit. He becomes unseated the moment:-:the, 
court notices that he h~s proved nothing mo1~e than a wish~ 
a desire (for whatever the reason) not to associ~te further. 
with petitioner in their club. It would indeed be· a ·wondrous: 
doctrine which permitted members of a corporate club in ef-, 
feet to expel each other through dissolution proceedings~ 
simply because half of them wanted to. No matter how strong. 
the desire, they are obliged by statute to make some sort of_ 
showing of a failure of corporate purposes. As far as .car1-y-
ing the burden of proof is concerned, complainant .Serpell 
might just as well have c]aimed that a sudden explosion, in--
stead of a dispute, was the motive which gave rise to hi~ pro-
fessed preferences and inclinations in the matter· of. shooting. 
at the White Marsh Club. The claim boils down t~ a ·mere 
dissatisfaction over the make-up of the membership, · which 
thus far in the annals. of our law is a wholly novel and un-. 
. tried ground of corpornte dissolu~ion. It need only be re-
marked that Serpell has no g-reater rig·hts than Baird-they 
are in every respect on a mutual footing-and if he suddenly 
professes to find the latter unsatisfactory as a club member, 
his remedy is the remedy of every other club member similarly 
situated: to withdraw, and not.to try to run away with the 
entire club, literally lock, stock and barrel (R., p. 39). 
If this were an ordinary corporation, and if there were a 
majority against a minority, then Serpell could conceivably 
call a meeting and dispose of t]1e corporate assets over a 
minority protest. Even if th~re were a majority against 
Baird, however., tba t could not be done here, since only 
20* · the *courts can put non-stock corporations out of busi-
ness. The courts, too, are limited in their powers of go-
ing along with the majority o;r minority, as the case might 
be. Whoever asks the courts to act must pave the statutory 
way by establishing a failure of corporate purposes. The 
simple fact that in this case there are only two members, and 
one insists while the other resists the idea of dissolution; 
should make the Court extl·emely wary of ·entertaining the 
bill. Having equal and mutual rights, one should not be al-
lowed to prevail over the other unless u'pon the most satis-
factory and convincing showing. Examining the record here, 
it will be seen that the sum total of ~vidence introduced by 
complainants consists of an agg·regate of six typewritten 
lines. Surely no other .court has so lightly dissolved a cor-
poration ag·ainst the wishes of 50% in int~rest of the mem-
bers. 
For all the appellate court may know, from the record be-
fore us, this case 1:1-ay be similar to a situation where the m~m-
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hers of a golf dub, falling out :over a game of tiddly-winks, 
petulantly try to thwart the corporate purposes by bringing 
suit for dissolution. We, howeverc deny that in this case there 
has been any dispute between the menibers, and certainly none 
has been proven. The who.le cans~ of complaint seems to 
be bottomed on a theory that the "\Yhite ~Iarsh Club is a part-
nership or mere personal association, whereas in point of 
fact we are dealing .with a "body politic and corporate", the 
existence of which continues apart from the ''temporal vicis-
situdes'' of the parties in interest. Even in an unincorpo-
rated society, we should think that if some of the members 
claim they cannot get along with the others because of dis-
putes, the least they could prove, in order to terminate the 
club, would be: (1) what the disputes were about, (2) that the 
defendants brought on or were to blame for the disputes, and 
( 3) 'that the d-is1nifos hat/; reached such proportions that 
21 • nobody hail, or coitld 1,tse the club or profitably iljattend a 
·meeting. As against these tests, there exists in the way 
of proof from the complainants only the single, vaporous 
word-' 'disputes~'. 
With no more equity than complainants have shown, there-
fore~ it is submitted that their proof is hopelessly inadequate 
and cannot be taken seriously. 
THE STAY. 
No especial point is made here as to the court's error in 
overruling the motion for a stay. The harm has largely been 
done and the point is useless, unless this court should concur 
in all of Judge Jacob's actions below. It would then become 
important in order to stay a sale of the properties for the 
duration, for the following. reB;sons. 
Petitioner would naturally be expected, and is entitled, to 
bid at a sale and take such steps preliminary thereto as wou]d 
best promote his interests. He has so testified (R., p. 29). 
He 'further related that being both unwilling· and ulia ble to 
buy in the entire club for himself personally, he wanted to 
influence some of his friends who were interested in hunting 
t-o join with him and, in effect, form a new club. But most of 
those friends are likewise in the service. Manv are scattered 
over the far corners of the earth; one, in fact, ·is at this writ-
ing still a prisoner of war in G~rmany. n·is this friend who 
respondent is particularly anxious to have join with him, be-
cause of the many years they have hunted together oil the 
White Marsh property. 
We think it demonstrable in the statement, that a Naval 
lieutenant ·on active duty, even in his own home locality,.would 
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be severely handicapped if n9t entirely prevented from pro-
tecting his rightful interests in such a situation. The Soldier.'s 
and Sailor's Civil Relief Act ( 50 U. S. Code Annotated, sec. 
501, esp. sec. 521) is fortunately broad enough to prevellt the 
Wnd of injustice that would result from a forced sale in tl,is 
case. 
*One glance at Juq.ge Jacob's pronouncement of de-
22* cision on this phase of the matter (R., pp. 29-33) must 
satisfy the ~ost skeptical that he decided petitioner's 
right to a stay, solely on the theory that the latter was nothing 
more than a witness to, rather than a participant in, the case. 
Now here within the bounds· of his announced reasoning can 
we find more than a reference to the fact that he was satisfied 
that petitioner could secure the necessary time off from his 
duties to attend a hearing i'li court. No consideration what-
ever_ ( again, the record speaJrs for itself) was given to any 
of the following obvious factors: · 
1. That the suit, involving a cluck club, implied no moral, 
legal or financial obligations which were sought to be evaded 
by the person in the service, and concerned a pure luxury 
whi~h could he disposed of after the war without penalizing 
the complainants (for ought they showed) in the slightest. 
2. That simply attending a hearing does not begin to de-
scribe the distraction to a litigant of def ending suit. It is 
ju_st not facing the realities to omit the .elements of personal 
worry, investigation, preparation, consultations with coun-
sel, arranging to and attending frequent meetings in chambers 
and at the bar, r-eadying for a contested reference, the. numer-
ous· steps and procedures incident to· appeal, and, finally, an-
ticipating the worst in the ultimate outcome of the litigation. 
·Judge Jacob again did not face a reality when he refmfed 
to consider the fact that petitioner was a former practicing 
attoFney whose attention and time would naturally be II)Ore 
engaged in a litigation against himself than a layman. 'He 
brushed aside petitioner's constitutional right to conduct his 
own def ense-rir as much of it as he could within limitations 
of time-by suggesting that appointed counsel should assume 
the burden. And all of this, despite obvious indications that 
the suit was a grudge suit involving the feeling·s of the parties. 
Pervading the entire decision was counsel's mental slant 
23~ that all *that was necessary to be shown was the serv-
iceman's ability to beg off for an afternoon in court. 
Under the decided cases, the Relief Aot places the burden 
upon the party resisting the motion for a stay. 50 U. S. C. 
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A., Sec. 521, note 25. The fact of military services creates 
certain presumptions, and the party. opposing the serviceman 
must satisfy the court that those presumptions are unfounded. 
The record here discloses that petitioner is fully occupied by 
his military duties every day in the week. A person serving 
seven days a week, every week, of necessity can not have a 
great deal of time for his usual p·ursu.its, his family or his 
friends. It is likely that he is absorbed in his duties and 
concentrated on matters which far remove him from those 
ways of thinking and being that characterized his normal 
life .. Personal litigation in such circumstances is, we sub-
mit, bound to consume those intervals which the Service in-
tends for relaxation and recreation. 
Hig·h ranking officials of the Navy testified that petitioner 
~'is in no position to conduct a defense to this. litigation", 
for the reasons outlined in their affidavit (R., p. 14). One of 
the· most important reasons cited by Admiral Rockwell was 
that petitioner is under orders not to engage in any private 
activity fo1~ personal profit or gain, or participate in anything 
which would '' consume his time and distract his attention dur-
ing office hours''. "'What the af:fiants were interested in was, 
of course, to prevent interference with petitioner's duties 
under them; certainly the Navy has a ju,sti.fiable expectation 
under the Relief Act that its officers, wherever stationed, will 
not be harassed in time of war by personal litigation over 
such non-essentials as duck clubs. What the petitioner was 
interested in, aside from creditably performing his duties, 
is being free to come and go as he chooses, so as to be on a 
par with his adversaries where litigating and selling are 
24* concerned. *Under the theory of Judge Jacob's de-
cision, however, he must accept the consolation of "a 
day in court''-literally, and no more. 
It will be noticed that the wliole attack upon petitioner as 
a member of the service is based upon what. he did or was 
thought to have done during those intervals of relaxation and 
recreation-during his scant leave or time off. The impres-
sion was obviously sought to be created, in Senator Tyler's 
sarcastic affidavit (R., p. 17), that.Lieutenant Baird had more 
spare time in the Navy than he did .as a civilian in Norfolk. 
The Senator appeared incensed at the thought that petitioner 
had had nearly two weeks' leave during the year, ·which was 
spent .almost entirely in hunting. Let's stop here for one 
moment .. The motion for a stay was· pending throughou.t the 
r,ntire hun-ting season.. Of the eighty days in the season, pe-
titioner enjoyed four full shooting trips and four or five after-
noons at the White Marsh Club. Why, may we ask, was tho 
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motion not brought on for hearing, and the litigation pur-
sued, during all of this so-called leisure time? Surely coun-
sel must have been just as willing to sacrifice his days of 
recreation at the club as he seems to think petitioner should 
have been. Within our observation, there was no reference 
below to any authorities or even the headnote~ collected under 
- Title 50 U. S. C. A. section 521. The slightest consideration 
of how other courts have viewed such a controversy will suf-
fice to show that questions as to leave and ability to appear 
at a trial have no place whatever in a decision under the Act. 
To construe it otherwise would result in a situation where 
every service man, hailed into court, would have to face a 
lengthy preliminary issue involving his availability or non-
availability for private purposes. As illustrative of the lib-
eral interpretation given the Act, a plaintiff in a damage suit 
has been required to reduce the amount of his demands so as 
not to exceed the serviceman defendant's liability insur-
25* ance policy, on pain of having his ""litigation stayed. 50 
U. S. C. A. App. Sec. 521, note 20. 
The reasoning of the court below may well apply to a per-
son stationed anywhere in the continental U~ S. The in-
clination was to ig·nore the relief accorded a ·person in the 
service, just so long as process can be served on . him. · Cer-
tainly for the important reason of clarifying the federal law, 
for the guidance of trial courts :whose judgments are the prac-
tical ultimate for service men,. this court should pronounce 
in plain terms that the Relief Act will apply, irrespective of 
personal service of process and an ability to spend an after-
noon in court, unless the party resisting the stay carries the 
heavy burden imposed on him by law. That burden, we sub-
mit, must demonstrate conyincingly not only that a.person's 
ability to defend is not materially affected by his service, but 
also that his defense will .not ~aterially affect his ability to 
serve. Only by doing so can this court give meaning to the 
warning pr~amble to the Act-"in order to enable such per-
sons to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the 
Nation, * • * . ',-
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY. 
Petitioner asserted in his answer th'at the property was 
susceptible to partition or division in kind, and prayed that, 
if anything, it should be_ partitioned rather than sold (R., pp. 
39, 40). The court, believing it could order a distribution of 
the corporate assets in kind under its equitable powers, at 
first was inclined to do so, but when the two complaniants 
~o 
~nd tp.ejr cot;m.sel (who are si$ter, brother, and son and 
~ephew, respectiv~ly) insisted th~t their portion~ also be 
s~parated and divided, if E\ny dtvidin,g was done, the order 
deci;eeing a sale was entered. N 9ne of the parti~s claimed 
that the property was such as to be divisible into three sepa-
i;at~ pB:rts; petitioner was proce~ding OJJ. the theory that it 
should be partitioned only so far as neces~ary to permit 
26* him in ef(ect to accept a fair share for his membership 
•and thus retire from the club~ Complain8=nt1:1, however, 
met the sugg~stion with their custoII1a:r;y g·enerosity and, evi-
dently fearing to part with so Inuch as a Inal'sh weed from 
''their'' property, took the palpably a.bs-µrd and defeatist 
position of s~ying, in effect, '' A.H. right, if you are entitled to 
divide out your share, we ~re just as e.ntitled to divide up 
ours''. 
The· point before the court, therefore, wa~ wh~th~r to refer 
the matter to a comµiissioner for decision over a partition 
i:µto three equal parts or, as. Wc:3 asked, partition in such man"" 
ner as was lawful and just. All parties bej11g ~greed on the 
µnpracticaJ>ility of dividing it three wEiys, the court refused 
to give the COilllllissioner any discretion in deciding tbe ques-
tion &nd, in th~ end, wit4held th~ :µiatter frorp. refer~nce en.,. 
tirely, 
We think this was erroneous because (l) it assuni~d that 
Mr~. Tyler had an interest in the property and a choice in the 
q~e~tian of pa,:rtitio~, and (2) it cut off petitioner's oppor'" 
tul)ity of showing that J\fr. Serpell 's insistence on a three,. 
way ~ivision was frivilous, unreasonable and taken p1;1rely for 
the purpose of def eating an oth~rwise fair and f eas,ible pa,r,. 
tition. Everybod.y in the ca,se knows that it js iIIlpossible 
to d.ivide the club property into . tliree equal parts; yet the 
compla:inants nevertheless foolr the position of insisting on 
the iµipossible, solely for tha. mupose of def eating a mem,-
ber 's bofia fide request to divide qut his share and retire. Pe-
titioner sho11ld at lef:l,st have had a chance of supporting his 
cont~:p.tion with proof,. if he cquld. · 
Mrs. Tyler's persistence on a three-way division or p0:rti-
tion makes it necessary to consider her exact rights in the 
premises. Her attempt to blook &n otherwise practicable par-
tition, by interposing imaginary rights to a parity interest, 
with niembers, was hq.t pa:rt of oo~pla,h1ants' joint plE\n to 
frustrate petition i'fl. toto on thJs score. While we admittedly 
have heretofore proceedecl 011 a vague supposition tliat 
ir11: Mrs. Tyler llad f3ome interest in the ,;+,proceeds of anv 
sale, a position wliioh p&rtie~ have habitually assum~rl 
out of it s.pfrit of frie.ndlinass takes on B: different nspect wlrnn 
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oiie of them s.eeks to take advantage of it_in adversary litiga-
tion .. Certainly if the assumption was a mutually mistaken 
oiie, it operated to confer no ptoperty rights on Mrs. Tyler 
that she did not othetwise possess. 1\.t any rate, in the lower 
court we only went so far as to. contend that she had no vote 
or voice in the club and, therefore; ~n the litigation. We 
simply contended that she should either be dismissed or, at 
her election, be transposed to the position of a_ party respond-
ent, so that ~he comtnissiofiet could decide (when, as and if a 
sale or partition was had) whether she had any claim on tho 
proceeds by virtue of whatever further facts she could mus-
ter before him. The point, however, like a number of others 
was not fully developed before Judge Jacob, who seemed re-
luctafit to make any differentiation ·whatever between Mrs 
Tyl_er's rights and a member's rights. Her counsel, having 
taken such nn extreihe position in the matter of partition, can 
not now escape analyzing the principles upon which he seeks 
to base his claim. 
1f :Mrs. Tyler has no right to use th~ club or vote for a sale 
or plH\tition, eith~r. in a board meeting or in a court, the prin-
ciple carried to its logical conclusion means that she inherited 
nothing from her late hl1sband. It is difficult to understand 
how art interest in the club .cnn be disassociated from mem-
be1~ship. Either a person is a member with full rig•hts, or 
he is not a member and has no rights or interest. After care-
ftilly con~idet'ing the matter, \ve do not see how anyone can 
bave.an interest in the property of the White Marsh Club-
ot ih any other non-stock corporation with comparable by-
laws-u~Jess he is a member. A membership does not au .. 
tomatically . survive upon death, ns against the other mem-
bers. Otherwise an unacceptable transferee could be 
28* foisted on them, contrary to their rig·hts *as de.fined by 
section 9 of the by-laws. To this exte·nt, the ref ore, 
White Marsh memberships ar~ for life only. Every transfer 
of membership is naturally, and expressly, subject to approyal 
or election by the club. If that approval is asked and given, 
then the memb<Wship may be said to have been transferred 
ot ijontinued over into the new member. But until that privi-
~ege is accorded, a party who in effect holds the physical evi-
dence of metnbership issued in the hame of his transferor 
(.the original mem~er) acquires no interest in or right against 
the cotpotatfon. Until he meets all of the conditions prece-
dent to membership, he hardly has anythirtg more than a 
hop~ ot expectation. There m~y be numerous reasonable 
qnaliffo-atit?lis fot entra~ce into the club which the members 
feel he lacks, whethei· stated in the by-laws or existing sim-
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ply ais reasons in the ~inds of . such members. as blackball 
him. · .· . 
If a member's interest is thus not transferable, it is not 
property in any true sense. The interest follows the use and 
is not divisible or separable ~etween transferor and trans-
feree. When the use ceases by death or resignation, the in-
terest terminates likewise, except of course when the volun-
tary consent of the club to a trans£ er or succession is be-
stowed. The idea that an own~rship or proprietary interest 
may be fortuitously transfe'rred to one person, with the right 
of controL a1~d use in another, is repugnant to every prop-
erty concept. The unelected transferee obviously has no re-
course against the club. It can continue on indefinitely, with 
good and sufficient reasons for withholding the honor and 
privilege of members4ip. T4ere is nothing to prevent the 
club from incl·easing initiation fees, or electing a full com-
plement of members, in the meantime. This is not a stock 
company_.:._the only thing it can issue is a membership. The 
membership dies with the individual and the club is vested 
with coniplete and literal control over who shall be the 
29* successor and when a succession shall take place, *if at 
~l • 
We, therefore, do not think t:q.at Mrs. Tyler has anything 
to speak for .in this litigation. She should have ·been dis-
missed outright. But, whether she should have been dis-
missed, or relegated to the status of a temporary respondent, 
the fact ]Jas to be faced that, not-being a member, her voice 
as to selling or dividing can not be treated on a. level· with 
Serpell 's and Baird's._ 
The court's refusal to consider a two-way partition was 
accordingly error. The extent of Mrs. Tyler's rights are in 
controversy and should be defined and adjudicated, irrespec-
tive of ·whether the bill is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION. 
The burden of this petition is to ask the Appellate Court to 
see throup;h the petty differences .of the parties litigant, and 
examin~ the record to determine whether complainants have 
made out a bona fide case. In so doing; the Court is aided 
by the circumstance that there can be no question over the 
facts because no witnesses appeared and testified below-all 
of the evidenc~ on the merits is in the shape of a brief written 
stipulation. A trial can therefore be had de novo, and a de-
cree entered in this Court that rightfully ought to have been 
entered in the Circuit Court-dismissing the bill, with costs. 
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. WHEREFORE petitioner prays for an .appeal- froJn. the 
aforesaid decrees, in accordance with .the f or~going; and that 
they will be reviewed and reversed; and he will, as in duty 
bound, ever pray, etc. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD R. BAIRD, JR., 
By GEORGE' M. LANNING, . 
His 4ppointed Counsel. 
30* . e1, Georg·e M. Lanning, an attorney practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that 
in my opinion the decr~es complained of in the foregoing pe-
tition should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia. 
. GE_ORGE M. · LANNING. 
Copy of this petition received this 15th day of May, 1945. 
J. HOGE TYLER, III,. 
Counsel for Appellees. 
Received May 14, 1945. 
J. W. E. 
June 5, 1945. Appeal awarded by the Court. Bond $500. 
M. B. W. 
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RE CO-RD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on the 30th day of March, in fhe 
year 1945. 
BE IT REMEMBERED,. that hereto£ ore, to-wit: In the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at the Rules holden for 
said Court on the :first Monday in October, 1944, came the 
complainants, Nelle S. Tyler and Goldsborough Serpell and 
filed their Bill in Chancery against White Marsh Club, a non-
stock corporation, Edward R. Baird, Jr., Virginia·Baird Tay-
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loe and Katherine B. Segar, Defendants, in the following 
words and figures, to-wit i 
Virginia: 
In. the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Nelle S. 'l'tl~t and Goldsb&rough Serpell, Complainants, 
v. 
White Marsh Club; a ~on-stock corporation, Edward R. Baird, 
Jr., Virginia Baird Tayloe and Katherine B. Segar, De-
fendants. 
IN C.IlANOERY. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
To the Honorable Judge Clyde H. Jacob, Judge of the said 
Court: 
Your complainants, Nelle S. Tyler and Goldsborough Ser-
pell, humbly n.sk leave to show unto the Court the following 
case: 
(1) The White Marsh Club was incorporated as a rtnn-stock 
corporation with its principal office in the City of 
page 2 } Norfolk, Virginia, on August 20, 1937, and the pur-
pose for which the Club was formed was the hunt-
ing; fowling, fishing ahd _gunning for game. .A. copy of the 
Certificate of Incorporation is filed herewith marked "Ex-. 
hibit A" antl asked to be read· as a part hereof. _ The incor-
porators, members and directors were Edward R. Baird, S. 
Heth Tyler and Goldsborough Ser.pell. 
(2) The sole assets of the Corporation are the following 
described real and per~onal property, all situated in Princess 
Anne County, Virginia: 
;1st: .A)i of th~ Marsh property Jorinerly owned by G. Ser-
pell on Shipp's Bay, which was purchased by him from J.E. 
White, in the County of Princess Anne, Virginia, and bounded 
~p,d descri~~d as follow~: ~n t!:ie .soµt4. by the Ianq of W. T. 
~avis ;_ 0ft the w~~t by the l_and pf J. E. White and_ the tract 
oJ land conveyed he~~in un~er. _t~¢ seMnd pa_~·agraph, and ~n 
~e north by the land of W. W. Dawley; and on th_~_ east by 
S,hip.p;s Bay and the pr<;lper_ty_belong~:ng tq the Back Bay Gu~:. 
1 n1ng Club; known ·as the Sellinger Marsh and by property 
Edw{t~il Jl~ ~ijiJ·~ Jr!~ v. Neije S .. ~yler, et al. 7~ 
~~~µ joiµtly by B~rry, Tyler, Hobbs ancl ~erpell; p1,1rchas~4 
f rQDl t4e 13~c}r ~ay Gµnni~g Club. 
2nd: Also that certain tract of high land, on whi!3h is now 
located the Club ij:QIJ.~e and outbuildings of the White Mtirsh 
Fowling Club, Incorporated, bounded· and described as fol-
lows, t9:-~t: :a~gi.rining at A cep.a.r st&k~ at t4e edge of the 
µiarsh abov~ copveyeg, w4ich sta~e is in a southeast direo-
tion fr.pm the s~id Olu.b !:louse, runni:p.g th~nce in. a west .. 
warqly dir~ption to a marJ{ed pine tre~ in a grov13 of pines ~ 
· · thence i.p ~ northw~rdly di:rectjon to a cedar stakp 
p~ge ~ ~ in the edge of said. m~rsh, thence in an eastwardly 
dir,(:}c~ion to the edge of the marsh above conveyed; 
thenc~ ip. a sotJthw~rdly direqtiou ~Jol).g the edge of the marsh 
to the point of beginning. . 
4\-nd alsQ ~11 the rig4ts and privHeges of ingress and egress 
wlµ~h were granted to the said "'\Vhite Marsh Fowling Qlub, 
ll}.corpor~ted, its assigns, its :rµembers and their guests, its 
e:µiployee~ ~nd servants, which were granted to G. Serpell in 
the geaq fr.all} J.~mes ]1. White et ux, dated :March ~8th, 1913, 
ijll.¢{ duly r~cordecl, j.n the Clerk's Of flee of the Circuit Court 
qf P.rip¢¢~s Ann~ Qouµty, in Deed Book 91, page 36, over the 
property pf the said J a:qies ~- ··white, to and from the said 
N;tp.!~ll p1~9p~rty, aµd to &nd from the said tract of la:µd con-
veyeg in t~e $CCo~d. paFagraph allO'Ve. 
It is ag!reeq anq lJ.~clerstood, however, between the parties 
t:qat this cq11v~y~11c~ is Sll,pje~t to the right of way for the 
ben~fit (?f E, J. W]µt~ and his lawful heirs, set out in the 
sflid deed appye mentioned. 
3rd: .All that certain tract or parcel of :Marsh land in the 
County of fr-incess Anne, Virgmia, known as '' Bread Is-
la:µ«", ppntai~ing Qne aqre, twQ roods and thirty-five poles, 
~c~o:rding· to a survey on wb~oh a grant for same was issued 
tP Georg~ W. Dawley on t4e 10th day of April, 1875, which 
gnmt i~ recqrded in the Clerk~s Office of th~ Circuit 
page 4 ~ Court of Princess Anne_ in De~~ B.ook 53, page 25, 
said Island being situated in Back Bay, and bounded 
qn flll sides by the waters of the s~id Bay. 
~th: g.ihat c~rtajn tract of ~ar~b land sitqated in the waters 
pf Baok B~y, P~ngo Iv.J:agiste:dal District, Princess Anne 
0QtJnty, Virgiµia,, ~he saµie being knqwn as ''Little Stinger 
lshind ~' 3rnd shell roe~, as de~cribe£1 in deed from E. R.. F. 
Wells ~nd V. H. Kellam, Sp~cial OoPJ:missioners, etc., to R. 
lt Reed, pearing d_at~ Septeqiber 14th, 1909, and duly re-
corded anµ also cle.scr-ibed h1 tl~e or-iginal -grant from the CoU1-
monwealth of Virginia to Tanor C. Whitehurst ( dated May 
26 Supreme Couit. of Appeals of· Virginia: 
7th, 1880, and recorded in the· Clerk's 0£.fice of the Circuit 
Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia, in Deed Book 55, 
page 129). -
5th: The following three parcels of land : 
Those two certain tracts or parcels of i:narsh land called 
1·espectively Auger Island and Sylvester Island ( sometimes 
called Southwest Island), lying and being in the County of 
Princess Anne; the said Auger Island containing two (2) 
acres and two ( 2) roods of marsh land, surrounded on all 
sides by the waters of Back Bay. Said Sylvester Island, · 
which is sometimes called Southwest Island, contains one (1) 
acre of marsh land and is surrounded on all sides by the 
waters of Back Bay. 
· Also a certain strip of land thirty ( 30) feet wide, measur-
ing from the water's edge on the main marsh of said Back 
Bay Gunning Club, lying· Eastwardly and Southwardly of 
· said Sylvester Island, and binding Sylvester Cove, 
page 5 } the southern line of said strip of land commencing 
at a point on the line between the property of the 
White Marsh Fowling Club, Incorporated, and also formerly 
belonging to James E. ·white, thirty ( 30) feet, measuring from 
the water line, South of the water's edge of Sylvester Cove; 
thence Eastwardly and northerly and parallel wit:h. the mean-
derings of the shore line of Sylvester Cove, and at a distance 
of thirty (30) feet therefrom, to Shipp's Bay, at a point thirty 
(30) feet Eastwardly or Southeastwardly from the mouth of 
Sylvester Cove, together with all right, title and interest of 
the White Marsh Fowling· Club, Incorporated, in said Syl-
vester Cove . 
. Also the following personal property: All the boats, mo.:. 
tor boats, and equipment thereon and fittings therein, boat 
houses, decoys a~d decoy weights, all furniture and furnish-
ings in the Club House and all other personal.property owned 
by the White Marsh Fowling Club, Incorporated, on the prop-
erty above described. - . 
(3) Edward R. Baird died on December 11, 1940, and S. 
Heth Tyler died on September 5, 1943. N: o · other members 
of the said Club have been elected and Goldsborough Serpell 
is the sole surviving member. Edward R. Baird died testate 
and his Will probated in the Circuit Court of the City of Nor-
folk, Virginia, did not specifically dispose of his interest in 
the said Club, but Edward R. Baird, Jr., .Katherine B. Segar 
and Virginia B. Tayloe were named residuary devisees. S. 
/, 
Edward R. Bahd, Jr., v. Nelle S. Tylet; et al. 
Heth Tyler died testate ·and liis Will probated in tlie 
page 6 ~ Corporation Court of:the Oity of Norfolk, Virginia, 
left all of his property, including his interest in the 
White Marsh Club, to Nelle S. Tyler, one of your complain-
ants. 
(4) Edward R. Baird, Jr., was elected Secretary and·Treas-
1irer of the White Marsh Club on September 16, 1942, and· stiU 
holds his office. Your complainants allege that safcl Edw:atd 
R. Baird, Jr., is in the service of the Navy of the United 
States. 
(5) Your complainants allege that with the death of two. of 
the three members of the White M:;arsh ·Club the. purpose ·for 
which this corporation was formed has completely failed. 
I 
Now, therefore, :your complainants, being without remedy 
save in a Court of Equity, where such matters are properly 
cognizable, pray that the. White Marsh Club, Edwa.rd R. 
Baird, Jr., Katherine B. Segar and Virginia B. Tayloe_ be 
made parties ·defendant and requir~d to answer this Bill, but 
not under oath, answer under oath being hereby expressly 
waived; that the said White 'Marsh, Club, a non-stock cor-
poration be dissolved in accordance with Se~tion 3880 of the 
Code of Virg·inia; that a Special Qommissioner be appointed 
and directed to offer the assets of the said Club fdr · Sale at 
public-or private sale; that the proceeds of such saie, ~fter 
the payment of costs of this suit and all of the debts of the 
said corporation, be distributed to those persons entitled 
thereto; that if th~ said Edward R. Baird, Jr., a person in fu.e 
military service, does not answer this Bill, a competent at;. 
torney be appointed to represent his interest; and that your 
complainants be given such other and further relief as the 
nature of their complaint demands and to equity 
page 7 ~ may seem meet. . . 
-And your complainants will ever pray, etc. 
NELLE S. TYLER, 
GOLDSBOROUGH SERPELL, 
By MANN & TYLER, 
Their Counsel. 
t· MANN & TYLER, 
Attorneys for .Complainants. 
EYi:rr1::qrn , , A" . 
. ~:-LY.+ -~ . 
CERTIFICATE OF l:NCORPORATIO:N 
.... ' ...... , ... bF" . . . . . .... . 
WfilTE MARSH CLUB . 
. r1µ~ is· to. c~rtify t~~t we, t4e ·µn~ersig~n~~' cl~~iF~ ~9 a,nd 
P.~r~hY dp ~~spci~t~ tq incorpqrate 3: hu~~ti~g &Pd fisWng cl~b 
in wJiic~ no ~a:git;:il. st9.Qk i~ req~freq, uµd~r th~ provisions 
and subject to the requirements of the laws for such ~as~s 
mag~ ami Iff-9Vi<;l~cl, 3:µg., 'by tb,is o~i; tJ~rµ~~~t~ Qf i~9rp9ra-
tfAn? §@i fqr~4 P.§1 fpllqw~: · 
1: The name of the corporation is to be White Marsh Club. 
~: i'he 1:1~~~ of t4~ cjty wh~r~~ its principal qffi~e j~ this 
StEJ,t~ i~ tg ge 1QP~t~4 if:! tjle Oi~y of NorfolJr, Virginia. 
3: 'fli~ purp9s~s fp.r which it i~ form~d are· as follows: 
:qµ:qtiµg, fowli~g~ fi~liing and gµnn~g for game i a,lso thp 
p,n>pag~t!~~ ~nq. ·pre~~ryEttioµ of g~µie of eve:ry kin~ an~ q.e-
. '· ~~ription in the· Cou11ty of Prin~ess Anne, in the 
P,~~e 8 ~ ~t;~,te pf Yirginh1,;· ~nq · ~ls~w~~r~ i:q saiq State; to 
· bm1g, ~onstrlJC~ llnd m~n1tam club hpµ~e~, hqt~ls 
a~q. pl~~stJr~ reso!ts within the ~aid territory; to ~cquire, 
µ,plf;l, · P.~, ~eve}op, WIP.f Pv~, l~aa,e, s~lJ, grant, nwr,tgijge ~µcl 
~oµyey Uip.cl~,. mar~Iws, · w~t~rs aµcJ ·riparia:µ privil~ge~ and the 
~µµiµ,~rflrµon of th~ spe~i~~ pqwers flllA p-qi;poses ~h~H not be 
~~mst:rµ,eq. as t:n any WllY limit~µg ~r r~~tr.ictiµg g~nen1l. rrrff .. 
po~~~ ~µ~ powers ~~:r~in set f ~rth a:qrl: whic)l are n~w or m~y 
Iwr~~ft~:r be cqnfa,rreq PY lirw~ 
i; the P.lA~hm~m p.1Jm.ll~r ~f ~ireqt<;>rs w11A ~r~ tq ~a~l\ge 
th~ af aJr,~ qf tne ~orp,or~tion sp~µ g.e t~1:1, ancl th~ yapancies 
~~-,~u~.h µuniper ~r~ tg b~ fill~c'l qy fl :qi~jprity V<?t~ qf the mein .. 
hers of the said club. ·· · , 
5: 'fh~ mu;nes and !esicJf?nC~s qf th~ 9ffi~er~ ~nd directors 
who are to manage the affairs of the corporation for the first 
year of its exis~~nce a~e ~s f Q1~qws: 
Pr.esident, 
Vice-President, 
Secretary, 
OfflO:{ntlS 
Edward R. Baird, 
S. Heth Tyler, 
Goldsborou~·h Se:r;pell~ 
DffiECTORS 
Edward R. Baird, 
Goldsborough Serpell, 
S. Heth Tyler, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
N2rfQlk, Vjrgi~iq, 
N prfolk, virginia, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
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6: The period of duration of the corporation is unlimited~ 
7: The amount of real. estate to which its holdings at any 
one time is to be limited is ten thousand (10,000) acres. 
8: By-laws for the management, control, and operation of 
the corporation shall ·be adopted by ·the Board of 
page 9 ~ Directors. Such By-laws shall prescribe who may 
· be members of the corporation, and they may be 
amended or altered at any time by two-thirds vote of such 
members having voting power present in person or by proxy 
at a meeting duly called and held. 
Given under our hands this 14th day of August, 1937. 
Virginia: 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
EDW. R. BAIRD, 
S. HETH TYLER, 
GOLDSBOROUGH SERPELL. 
I, James Mann, a Commissioner in Chancery of the Circuit 
Court of the City aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do 
hereby certify that S. Heth Tyler, whose name is signed to the 
foregoing writing, bearing date on the 14th day of August, 
1937, has acknowledged the same before me in my city afore-
Haid. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of August, 1937. 
State of Virginia, 
· City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
JAM]~}S MANN, 
Commissioner in Chancery. 
I, Edw. R. Baird, Jr., a Notary Public for the city afore-
said in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that Edward 
R. Baird and Goldsborough Serpell, whose name$ are signed 
to the foregoing writing, bearing date on the 14th day of Au-
gust, 19_37; have acknowledged the same before me in my city 
aforesaid. 
My commission expires on the 19th day of Aug·ust, 1938! 
Given under my hand this 16th day of August, 1937. 
- EDW. R. BAIRD, JR., 
Notary Public. 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia_ 
page 10 } Virginia : 
In the Corporation Court of tbe City of Norfolk . 
. 
The foregoing certificate of incorporation of White Marsh 
Club, was presented to me, James U. Goode, Judge of the 
Corporation Court of the City 0£ Norfolk, No. 2, in Term 
Time, ~nd having been examined· by me, I thereupon ascer-
tained and certify hereon that the persons sig11ing and ac-
knowledging the foregoing certificates are of good moral char-
acter and suitable and proper persons to· be incorporated for 
the purposes set forth in said certificate of incorporation; 
and I further certify that the said certificate of incorpora-
tion is, in my opinion, signed ~nd acknowledged in accord-
ance with the requirements. of the law in such cases·made and 
provided. 
Given under my hand this ~7th day of Aug11st, 1937. 
. JAMES U. GOODE, 
Judge of the Corpo:ration Cou~t of the 
City of Norfolk, No. 2, 
Commonw_ealth of Virginia, 
Department of the State Corporation Commission, 
City of Richmond, 20th day of August, 1937. 
The accompanying certificate for incorporation, together 
with the charter fee required by law, having· been presented 
to the State Corporation Commission by Edw. R. Baird, S. 
Heth Tyler and Goldsborough Serpell, and the Hon. James U. 
Goode, Judge of the Corporation Court of the City of Nor- · 
folk, No. 2, having certified that the said persons signing said 
certificate are of good moral character and suitable and 
proper persons to be incorporated for the purposes therein 
set forth, and that the said certifi.ca te has been 
page 11 } signed and acknowledged by said applicants in ac-
cordance with law, the State Corporation Com-
mission having examined said certificate now declares that 
the said applicants have complied with the requirements . of 
law, and have entitled themselves to a charter, and it is there-
fore ordered that they and their associates and successors 
be, and they are, here.by ma4e_and created a ·body politic and 
corporate, under and-by the name of White Marsh Club, upon 
the terms and conditions and for the purposes set forth in 
said certificate, with all the powers and privileges conferred 
i 
J' 
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and subject to all the conditions.and re~trictions impos_ed by 
law. . · . . . . . 
And said certificate, with this o;rder,. iij hereby ordered to: 
be admitted to record. 
(Seal) H. LESTER HOOKER, Chairman. 
Sta~e ·Corporation Commission, Vh:gini~, 
Sic Semper Tyrawnis, 
Attest: 
N. W. ATKINSON, . 
· Clerk of the Commission. 
- Commonwealth of Virginia, 
Office of the State Corporation Commission, · 
In the City of Richmond, the 20th day of August, 1937. 
. ,,j 
The foregoing charter of White Marsh Club, was this day: 
received and duly admitted to record in this office and is. 
hereby certified· to the Clerk of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Norfolk, according to law. · 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, · .... 
By H. LESTER HOOKER, Chairman. 
Attest: 
N. W. ATKINSON,. . 
Clerk of the · Commission. 
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In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of. the City 
of Norfolk, the 26th day ·of :October, 1937, The foregoing char ... 
ter and certificate of the State Corporation Commission 
thereon was received, duly admitted to record, duly spread, 
and is now certified to the Clerk of the State Corporation 
Commission. 
A: Copy-Teste : 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
By L. B. ROBERTS, D. C. 
A Copy-Teste : 
W. L. PRIEUR, JR., Clerk. 
By M~ N. RUDOLPH, 
Deputy Clerk. 
3~· . Supreme Cour~ of Appeals of Virginia 
A.nd thereupon at the Rules holden for said Court on the 
3rd Monday in October, 1944, process having been e~ecuted 
on each of said defendants and defendants White Marsh Club 
and Edward R. Baird, Jr., having failed to appear; plead or 
answer· the Bill was taken for confessed as to said defend-
ants.; and thereupon the defendants Tayloe and Segar filed 
their joint and several answer and motion in the following 
words and figures, to-wit: and the cause was set for heaping 
as to them: 
For answer to the bill of complaint exhibited against them 
therein, these defendants say:. 
(1) That they have no interest whatsoever in the White 
Marsh Club. It is true that their father, Edward R, Bairdt 
was formerly a member with the late S. Heth Tyler and com-
plainant G. Serpell. However, as complainant Serpell and 
· the said S. Heth Tyler during his lifetime well knew 
page 13 ~ and approved of, their said father gave his interest 
to his son, Edward R. Baird, Jr., some time before 
his d~ath, and there are now and always have been at least 
two living members of said club participating equally and ac-
tively in the management, benefits and burdens. thereof. 
.. . ( 2) That, as alleged, their said brother Edwar<l: R. Baird, 
Jr., is in the military service of the United States. They are 
advised, and so allege, that he has a legal and meritoriou·s 
defense to this action but is · unable to assert and maintain 
the same by reason of his military service. He would, fur-
ther, be unable to protect and promote his interests if an 
auction or other sale of the entire club property should be 
decreed in accordance with the prayer of the bill of com-
plaint, for the same reason. They the ref ore move the court, 
in bis behalf, to stay all further proceeding·s herein until 60 
days after the release of the said Edward R. Baird, Jr., from 
active military duty, in accordance :with the statute in such 
cases made and provided. The affidavit of F. W. Rockwell, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., and W. P. 0. Clarke, Captain, U. S. 
N., is attached hi support of this application. 
And now having fully answered these defendants pray that 
they be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs in this 
behalf e:Kpe~ded. 
VIRGINIA BAIRD TAYLOE, 
KATHERINE BAffiD SEGAR, 
By GEORGE M. LANNING, . 
Their Counsel. 
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page 14 ~ State of Vh·ginia, 
Corporation of the City of Norfolk, to-wit: . 
This day personally appeared before me the undersigned 
Notary Public in and for the corporation of the city of Nor-
folk, State of Virginia, in my corporation and state afore-
said, F .. W. Rockwell and W. P. 0. Clarke, who being each 
by me first duly sworn, on their oaths deposed and said: 
1. That deponent F. \V. Rockwell is a rear admiral in the 
United States Navy at ptesent stationed in Norfolk and is 
in command of the .Amphibious Training Command, U.S. At-
lantic Fleet, the headquarters and offices of which are located 
in the building formerly known as the N ansemond Hotel at. 
Ocean. View; · . 
2. That deponent W. P. O. Clarke is a captain in the United 
States Navy and is chief of .. staff to the commander of the 
Amphibious Training Command, the said F. W. Rockwell; 
3. That Edward R. Baird, Jr., a lieutenant .in the United 
States Naval. Reserve, is attached to the staff of the com-
mander of the Amphibious Training Com~and and is serving 
directly under these deponents in the capacity of legal officer 
and advisor, with officers h1 the headquarters building; 
4. That office hours for the said staff are from 8 :30 a. m. 
to 5 :30 p. m. every day, including Saturdays. and Sundays, 
and all officers are on duty on a 24-hour basis each day, being 
required to be present on station and subject to orders dur-
ing the said office hours, and being subject . to call at all 
other times for such further orders and duty as may be re-
quired; the said officers of the staff are allowed 
page 15 t one half day off per week for recreation and neces .. 
· sary attention to personal business; 
5. That the official duties of the said Edward R. Baird, 
Jr.; requir~ his full th;p.e and attention; he is under orders 
not to engage in an~ activity or pu1·suit for personal profit or 
gain, and will n·ot be permitted by his present commanding 
officer (deponent F. W. Rockwell) to participate in personal 
or business matters which consume his time and distract his 
attention during office hours; 
6. That'the said Edward R. Baird, Jr., is from time to time 
in the regular course of his duties ordered away and outside 
of the city of Norfolk on temporary additional duty for the 
Amphibious Training Command; the said command, being a 
unit or part of the United States Atlantic Fleet, is subject 
to being removed and transferred in its entir~ty to another 
locality at any time, and moreover the said Edward R. Baird, 
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Jr., is himself subject to immediate detachment and tr.ansfer 
elsewhere by the Navy Department upon provision of suit-
~~ re~; . 
7. That they verily believe that the said Edward R. Baird, 
Jr., is in no position to conduct a defense to litigation brought 
for the purpose of selling the real estate of and dissolving· a 
club or company in which he is personally interested, or for 
any other comparable purpose, by reason of his present aerv-
ice and duty as a lieutenant in the United States Na val Re-
serve, as aforesaid. 
And further deponents. saith not. 
(Seal) 
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F. W. ROCKWELL, 
W. P. 0. CLARKE, 
Subscribed and sworn to before.me this 9th day of October, 
1944. · 
Given under my hand and seal: 
LA WREN CE B. WALES, 
Notary Public~ 
My Commission expires 6th Oct., 1947. 
AFFIDAVIT. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Nell S. Tyler, one of the Complainants in the above mat-
ter, being duly sworn according to law, takes oath that tho 
said Edward R. Baird, Jr., is a person in the Military Serv-
ice of the United States of America as defined in the Soldiers' 
and Sailo:t?s' Civil Relief Act of 194.0 ° and• the Acts Amenda.,. 
tory thereof. 
NELLE S. TYLER. 
Subscribe~ and .. sworn to before me, Marion P. Monteiro, a 
Notary Pubhc, this 25th day of November, 1944. 
My Commission expires: November 27, 1945. 
MARION P. MONTEIRO,-
N otary Public. 
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· And at another day, to-wit: in the Circuit Court aforesaid 
on·the 29th day of November, 1944. 
This cause came this day. to be heard on the Bill of Com-
plaint filed by the Complainants, on the Answer of 
page 17 }· Virginia Baird Tayloe and. Katherine B. Segar, · 
on the Affidavit of Nelle S. Tyler, one of the Oom-
plainants, to the effect that Edward- R. Baird, Jr., one of the 
Defendants, is a pers~m in the Military Service of the United 
States of .America, as defined in the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940 and -~cts Amendatory thereof, and' 
on motion duly made by Counsel on behalf of the said Com-
plainants that this Court appoint an attorney to represent 
the interests of the said Edward R. Baird, Jr., a person in 
the Military Service, inasmuch as. the said Edward 'R. Baird, 
Jr., has failed to app~ar herein, and was argued by Counsel 
for both Complainants and Defendants. 
It appearing to the Court that the· said Edward R. ·Baird, 
Jr., is a person in the Military Service and _has railed to ap-
pear herein, George M. Lanning, an attorney at law, is ap-
pointed to represent the interests of the said ·Edw~rd R. 
Baird, Jr. 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. HOGE TYLER, III. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, .a Notary Public 
m and for the City of Norfolk, State of Virginia, J. Hoge 
Tyler, III, who, being duly sworn, made the following state-
ment: 
Edward R. Baird, Jr., is attached to the Amphibious Train-
ing Command in their offices at the former N ansemond Ho-
tel, Ocean View, Norfolk, Virginia. He is resid-
page 18 ~ ing in his home, 1451 West Princess Anne Road, 
Norfolk, Virginia, in the Winter months and at his 
home at 10_7th Street, Virginia Beach, Virginia, during the 
Summer months. He was an active participant in the hunting 
from the·White Marsh property during the season of 1944-45; 
that to the knowledge of the affiant Edward R. Baird, Jr., 
was able to be relieved of his- arduous duties in the United 
States Navy for a minimum of eight days during the period 
from November 1st, 1944, to January 20th, 1945, which he 
saw fit to devote to duck shooting far removed from tele-
phonic communication with the Amphibious Training Com-
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:r:nand; that on one occasion he- was accompanied by a naval 
o~:ficer, who, your ~f:fiant was advised, was his commanding 
officer. That your affiant was advised by a member of Lieu-
-~enant Baird's· family on one ocC!l,sion that he was on a three-
day trip to Northern N eek; Virginia, shooting quail during 
· _the 1944 hunting season; that Lieutenant Baird advised your. 
af:fiant that he had been able to take several trips aboard 
boats of the United States Navy to Cape Charles, Virginia, 
fQt the purpose of fishing during the $ummer of 1944; that 
Lieutenant Baird found sufficient time in the early Fall of 
1944 to interest several of his f tiends in making your af:fiant 
an offer of $6,000.00 for the two,thirds interest of G.' Serpell 
and Nelle S~ Tyler in the Whit~ March Club which offer was 
refused by your affiant and a counter offer of $3,500.00 was 
made for the one-third interest of Lieutenant Baird, which 
was · refused by Lieutenant Baird; that as evidence of the 
leisure time Lieutenant Baird contemplated having, he ad-
vised yout affiant that he had been able to procl!re through 
· the United States ~avy a large quantity of shot-
page · 19 ~ gun shells suitable for hunting, at a time when it 
was neatly impossible for civilians to obtairt am-
munition for any purpose; that it is your affiant's belief that 
Lieutenant Baird has adequate opportunity and leisure time 
to take whatever steps that are necessary to defend the ac-
tion brought by G. Serpelf and Nelle S. Tyler for the purpose 
of dissolving· the White Marsh Club, Inc. 
J. HOGE TYLER, Ill. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of Feb-
ruary, 1945. 
·My Commission expires on the 27th day of November, 1945. 
MARION P. MONTEIRO, 
Notary Public. 
The following is a statement of Edward R. Baird, Jr. 
page 20 } Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Nelle s~ Tyler and Goldsborough Sei:pell, Complainants 
v. 
White Marsh Clnb, a non-stock corporation, Edwards R. 
Baird, Jr., Virginia Baird Tayloe, and Katherine B. Segai-, 
Defendants 
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IN CHANCERY. 
STATEMENT OF EDW .A.RD R. B:AIRD, JR. 
Before Hon. Clyde H. Jacob, Judge. 
February 21, 1945. , 
Appearances: J. Hoge Tyler, 3rd, Esq., counsel for tho 
complainants. . _ . 
George.JV!. Lanning·, Esq.,, counsel for Edward R. Baird, Jr. 
Edward R. Baird, J t ., in person. : 
Phlegar & Qraig 
Shorthand Reporters 
Norfolk, Virginia 
page 21 ~ Mr. Baird: If the Court please, I would like to 
make a statement. I had not intended to take any 
part in this _part of· the proceedingt befa-~1se I did not feel ft 
was becoming of me to dq it, but, since it is made to appear 
by this af&davit that. is being filed today that ~bat I do out 
of the Navy is more important than what I do m the Navy, I 
. do want to offer an explanation. I had Slipposed that the 
matter of a stay would be submitted to my superior officers 
and left with them largely, of rourse, subject to the judg-
ment of the Court, and I simply want to make as bri~f a state-
ment as I can to give a little of the backgrou~d. 
The Court : Go ahead. 
Mr. Baird: When I was transferred back to Norfolk by 
the Navy, I came by dispatch <frders with very little notice-=-
The Court: Where were you transferred from t 
l\fr .. Baird: I was at that time in :M::iamt, Florida, tmder-
going training for anti-submarine warfare, which I had al-
most finished. I was in the midst of my examinations. 
The Court: When was that Y 
;Mr. Baird: In May, 1943. _ 
The Court: And yon have been I1ere in this locality ever 
since that time? 
Mr. Baird: I have been here ever since that time. As I 
say, sir, I was transferred bgck in 1ight much of a hurry. 
I had my family down there. I had leased my home 
page 22 ~ in Norfolk . to. a friend in the Navy who, in tt?-rtt; 
had leased his home to a Na val office-r and who 
could not get into his home. When I got back, I had no place, 
myself, other than Na val quarters and no place to move my 
family to and it was necessary for me to think about that 
' 
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right quickly, b~cause the lease we had in Miami was rapidly 
expiring·. I could not find any place in Norfolk, but I did 
land on a place at Virginia Beach which could be purchased, 
and, as I had been anticipating,, or hoping, rather, to buy a 
place at Virginia Beach at som.e time, and as that appeared 
to be the most practical solution, I, with the assistance of a 
bank in Richmond, got a cottage in Virginia_ Beach and 
eventually moved my family into it. I simply say that in 
explanation of the sneer in this affidavit. 
I reported to Admiral Kirk for .duty and wa$ told by him 
that I had been brought to Norfolk, into the amphibious force, 
to take charge of the Maritime Law matters that were aris-
ing in co~ection with the amphibious training program. I 
was told by Admiral Kirk to devote my exclusive attention to 
all accident cases. · · 
Of co:nrse, I am very limited in what I can say in the nature 
of statistics or information that might be subject to security 
interests, but I think I can say that over the period of 1944 
the number of ships under the command to which 
page 23 r I was attached ran into the four figures. Very few 
people seem· to realize the enormity of the am-
phibious training program that goes on right here in N odolk. 
Besides that, this command has seven fairly large· bases un-
der it. They are· strung out from Maryland around the coast 
to Texas. I suppose there are around fifty thousand men 
undergoing .training at any given interval and the number of 
officers is, I suppose, 20 ·or 25 per cent of that number. I men..; 
tion that because it is my responsibility, not only to see that 
the proper action is taken in all accident cases, but to see to 
the administration of discipline in cases where, largely for 
my p1;1.rposes, officers get in difficulty with one another, which 
passes across my desk. I think Mr. Lanning·wiH agree with 
me that when anybody has a elient with. the number of ships 
running into four figures, he is not apt to have a great ~eal 
of time on his hands. A~ any rate,. the volume down ther4;' 
became such that I was given an assistant last year. I men-
tion that to the Court not to paint a picture that I am work-
ing my fingers to the bone; I mention it simply to point out 
that I have a certain amount of responsibilities which I a~ 
very sensible of. 
Now, going to my activities out of the Navy. After I had 
been there six or eight months, I ~onsulted my commanding 
officer, who was then Commodore Lee Johnson, as to· whether 
· I would be entitled to any leave. 
page 24 ~ The Court: After you had been where six 
monthst 
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· · Mr. Baird: Stationed here at Norfolk, at Ocean View. 
He said that the policy of th~ amphibious force of granting 
:fifteen days' leave ~ year would apply to me. I asked him • 
what would happen if I were awav for two weeks or one week. 
He shook his head and laughed and said, ''Well, vou can be 
the best judge of that,'' or some such remar~ so ('then asked 
him if it would be agreeable for me to ·take leave in the form 
of one day a week, such .of it as I could· get, to meet the needs 
of my office. That arrangement was .satisfactory with the 
officers there and I carried it out. !'had to go through the 
same process of straightening that out this year,. because I 
have still another commanding officer and .another chief of-
ficer. (There have been, of course, many changes in the per-
sonnel.) It was agreeable. Incidentally, the leave period, the 
Navy's year is from ,June to June, and not the calendar.year. 
I have taken leave this year on that basis one, day a week. 
I have not had a full fifteen days' leave. · Also, this Christ-· 
mas, a directive was passed around in the command head-
quaters that everybody would be entitled to a week's Chris-
mas leave which would not be counted as a part of the fifteen 
days.. That leave was to be arranged in shifts running over 
Christmas week and in the New Year's week. My assistant 
in the office took that leave and the two yeomen in my office 
took that leave, but I did not take it, because I did 
page 25 r not know what would happen if I was not ·there. 
Things are coming in and they require very 
prompt action in order to handle these cases. I don't think 
the Navy stays still a minute., even to the ships that we hit. 
I simply mention that because, while I did not want to bring 
it out at all, and I do. not want .to assert it as any favor of 
myself, I do want the Court to know that I feel essentially 
the responsibility down there and I have not, as is attempted 
to be proved in this case, been running all over the countrj · 
enjoying myself. . . · 
I am very devoted to hunting. That is my only recreation, 
and every day's leave that J can take off, I wotild take off 
in hunting, either ducks or qu~il. I think my antagonist in 
the affidavit has me down for eight days at the club. I don't 
believe he is quite exact in that. As I recall it, I went down 
there nine days, but ;not more than half of those times, I -am 
satisfied, -were full days. I would simply get off in the after-
noon after lunch and drive down to this place once in a 
while. · 
I particularly resent in the affidavit the reference to my 
commanding officer, because it is unfounded and wholly in-
correct., ·and I can see no reason for referring to the fact that 
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I took hi:r;n down there, other than a· very snide· insinuation · 
that ther.e ·is some collusion between me and my commanding 
· · officer, who filed this previous affidavit, as to 
page 26 ~ to whether or not I should defend this suit. I sup-
pose that the o:ffice:r that ·he is referring to is a 
Navy captain who happens to be a personal friend of mine, 
married and has a family, and has no connection with my 
comman~ing officer. He is in a· separate unit down there; he 
has his own separate command office. 
With reference to my fishing life, I think I did go on two 
, or three or four fishing trips. o However; they were simply 
afternoon excursions out at Little Or eek, proceeding ten or 
twelve ~iles up the Bay and coming back in time for supper. 
Those. were on my regular afternoons off. And I might 
elaborate on the previous affidavit that has been filed by my. 
commanding officer. "'\Ve are on duty every day in the week, 
including Sundays: We are supposed to have every other 
Sunday off, and the directives further say that .one afternoon 
off per week for recreation ancl attention to personal business 
is mandatory, but the "joker" in that is that they do not 
specify the afternoon off, and not all of us are able tq get 
those afternoons off with any regularity. Every time I leave 
there I have to obtain permission from the chief of staff, or· 
tell him I won't be there the next day. 
The ·court: Right at that point, Lieutenant, is it not true 
that your chief of staff would release you any clay that you 
had urgent business in town t 
-Mr. Baird: I am going to get to that, sir. 
page 27 r There is one other charge in the affidavit that 
seems to impute the Navy in some way, which re-
fers fo a large quantity of shot gun shells. I can't imagine 
how the information reacherl the affiant other than in a round-
. about way. 
The Court: I rather think that would be immaterial to 
the motion. 
Mr. Baird: I think it is quite immaterial, but it is in there 
and I would like to have an answer to that. No 8hot gun 
shells were obtained by me from the Navy until after the 
opening of this duck season, and the reference to '' a large 
quantity" undoubtedly e:xisits from reports which might have 
been derived from me or otherwise of the truly large·quantity 
that was released by the Bureau of Naval Ordnance to my 
command for distribution to our seven bases; and they were 
so dist.ributed. · 
Now, to get down to. summarizing the ~ntire thing, if your 
Honor please, and gettmg to the heart of it,. attempting at the 
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same time not to be arg1llllentative, I do not take the position 
for a moment that it would interfere seriously with my duties 
to appear in court on a certain day if I were able to doff 
. ~y cap, walk into court, dispose of the matter, put my cap 
back o~~ a~d leave an~ forget it. Tt · has never bee-µ piy con-
tention ·at all and I never bad any feeling that I would not 
be able to get d9wn here., if a tria] was set, simply 
p~ge 28 } for.· the purposes of testifying,· nor would .I have 
· · · any difficulty in eoming down here whatever after-
noon I ~ight have off. :M:y point there, sir,, is that your Honor 
,~11 r,ecogni~e that this proceeding is more or less a personal 
one, inyolving· ill feeli~1g:s, and it is going to be· sfrenuously 
eont~st~d fr9m both sides. If I have to file an answer., I ex~ 
pect to co~tend that t~e properties of this club should be 
· partitioned rather than sold, if anything, and, in any event, 
it must go to a contested reference, and I am certain in my 
o~n mind that the dissati~fi~d party with the ultimate deci-
sion will certainly appeal. Of course, I am represented by 
the most satisfactory counsel I could liave, but your- Honor 
will take into account the fact that I used to practice law and 
that I am not onlv personally interested h this., but would 
natuPally Ii~~· to do ·my OWll ~nvestigatfog and preparation 
and consultation with authorities, and so forth. It is not a 
matter that for · me ~imply ·irivo~ves coming· down . here one 
day or haif a d~y, but ~~volves the possibility-well, if you 
stop ~nd loo~ at it you will see that we have been litigating 
a~ost six ~onths and has not yet fi~ished the preliminary 
motion. So I say it is a matter that for me will extend in-
definitely. It is worrisome, and difficult to rid yourself of 
the impressio~ that you might lose in this suit a property 
which, you hav:e grown up in since childhood. I have· shot 
· · down there sin·ce the earliest days· that I can re-
page 2°9 ~ mem];>er. It has a peculi_ar value to me which I do 
· not put in terms of money. But, further than that, 
if you:r ~OD:Or please, I am he:1:e in a very awkward position 
should this property be put up for sale, because the friends 
that I would expect to interest in joining with me in putting 
. up the bi.d f 9r this proporty a_re i~ the service, most of them; 
some of them are here and some of them are scattered to the 
four corners 9f the earth,' ·one of who~. is ~lOW a prisoner of 
war in Germany, and who has ~hot with us ~lown ther.e for 
many y~ars. I am in no position, financially or otherwise, to 
buy tlie prpperty myself. ~ am willing and most an~~ous to 
.\I.ave tltls situation a_t our club either settled or litigated 
through, but I feel that my h~nds are somewhat tied: and·tbat 
. . . 
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wh~n I can get anything like a fair plan and basis with my 
antagonist I will be delighted to go ahead with it. 
That is about all I have to sav. 
The ·Court:· Lieutenant, the .. Court cannot be concerned 
with any personal feeling between the parties litigant .in this 
matter, nor can the Court be concerned with any sentimental 
value that you may attach to the property in which you ·are 
interested. The Court has to pass on the motion for a stay 
under the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940. Now, if 
you were serving your country in the South Pacific, or on 
foreign soil, or on the 1.Vest Coast, the Court would have no 
difficulty in feeling· that the act was intended, iu 
_i)age 30 ~ every case where the defendant was in such place, 
. to apply, and to grant the stay. Article I of the 
act, section 100 : '' In order to provide for strengthening and 
expediting· the national defense under the emergency, condi-
tions," and so forth, and it goes on to say: ''In order to 
enable such persons to devote. their entire energy to the ·de-
fense needs of the nation"-''their entire energ'Y." 
Now, the Court was advised by your attorney that, since 
May, or since you have been on duty here, a year and a half, 
you have been residing- in tbe City of Norfolk in your home. 
You report down to Ocean View, like you might be report-
ing to your office in town, and are relieved from duty or-
dinarily at five or six o'clock and spend the rest .of the day 
at yout home. So, your actual vocation, so far as hours con-
sumed, is no different from your former vocation, and you 
are not out of touch with what is going on in Norfolk. You 
are fortunate in having your partner here: operating your 
business. 
I do not believe that the act was intended to cover the 
case of a man in service who is situated as vou are and who 
~an g'.et an opportunity to go hunting, even· though you call 
it your leave time. If you have an opportunity, as set out in 
this affidavit, to go hunting six or seven or eig·l1t days in a 
row., surely your executive officer or your administrative of-
ficer, whoever may grant you leave, could grant 
page 31 } leave for a day in Court. 
Mr. Baird: The six or seven or eig·ht, days was 
not in a row. That is not even alleged. 
The Court: What does the affidavit provide forY How 
many days' of hunting does it sayY .· 
Mr~ Tyler: Nine days by liis statement, some of them be-
ing half-days in the afte1noons, that is, duck hunting. 
The Court: Of course, I may be ill advised, but I don't 
know of an officer at the base who cannot come to town any 
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time .he wants to if he has busin~ss to attend to, and his com-
manding officer wilt give him that opportunity. I am sd ad-
vised as to that. . 
As you say, you are allowed a day off or an afternoon off 
to attend to personal matters. This matter should not take 
half a day, as far as this court is concerned, as to whether 
or not a reference should be had or whether or not a sale 
should be had. I cannot conceive of ep.ough authorities on 
this question to consume over a half a day. There is no ques-
tion of te'stimony at all. Now, as you say, no doubt the party 
who might not predominate in this proceeding would want to 
go to the Court ·of Appeals.; and would go to the Court of .Ap-
peals if he could get an appeal, and that would be Mr~ Lan-
ning's duty, to prepare·the brief and argue the case. If you 
went lip there, of course, that would be a personal matter with 
you. But I cannot feel that this act was passed 
page 32 ~ ta hold up and penalize litig·ants who are not in the 
·service for the benefit of litigants who are in the 
service and who are situated as you are at this time, and the 
Court will enter the order that is presented. You have iU 
Mr~ Tyler: Might I make an amendment to show the pres-
ence of Mr. Baird here at this hearing? 
The Court: Do you want to dictate anything into the rec-
ord? 
Mr. Tyler: No, sir. 
Mr. Baird: I have testified; I want my statement put into 
the record. 
The Court: Yes. It l~as been agreed between counsel that 
March 1 is the day to take this matter up as to whether or 
not, under the facts in this case, the Court ean act Is that 
date going to be satisfactory to you Y If it is not going to 
be satisfactory, the Court will fix a day that is satisfactory. 
Mr. Baird: I can't possibly tell you that, sir. I haven't 
the slightest idea except from day to day on this thing. I 
may not even be here on the 1st of :AJarch. 
The Court: Then, March 1 is just as satisfactory as far 
as you know now, as any other dayf 
Mr. Baird: Yes, sir. 
The Court: If in advance of March 1 you learn that the 
·28th of February would be better, and counsel get 
page 33 } tagether, the Court will hear it then; or any other 
. . - day that you can get here. 
Mr.· Tyler: I am ready to hear it right now if it will be 
any more convenient to Mr. Baird. 1 am re3;dy to present 
my side of the case. . 
Mr: Baird: I don't see how we can do it when we have 
not filed an answer. I have not had a chance to l6o1=r into any 
ff SJ1ll:re1!1e Qoµ:rt of J+ppe~ls of Virginja 
a,utl\o:riti~a,. I dfrl oome clown town. one night in September 
to lQolr l\,t tpe l~w b,oolr~, which I have not·seen yet. 
( Th~rijupon, tha he~r~ng was concluded.) 
p~ge 84: ~ And at another day to-wit: in the Circuit Court 
aforesaid on the. 21st clay of Febr'-'ar.y, 1945. 
['~is cBt1,1ae c~me tliis day to be again heard on the Bill of 
Compl&int, the affid~vit of Nelle S. Tyler to the e.tfect that 
]Udwilrd :a,. Baird, Jr., one of the. defendants~ was in the Mili-
tary s~r.vic~, the Answer of Virginia B. Tayloe and Katherine 
B. Segar, the ~ffidavit of W. P. 0. t'1arke all;d F. W. Rockwell, 
the· aJfidavit of J. Ilqge Tyler, III, and the ~otion for a ~on-
tinuauce of thia cattse. made on behalf of one of the defend-
ants, Edward B,. Baird, Jr., by :rea.son of the provi~ions of the 
S0.ldfo:rs' and Sailors~ Oivil Relief Act, on the testimpny 
of Edwa,rd R. Baird, Jr., and was argued _by Oounsel for all 
parties. · 
It appearing ta the Court that Edward R. Baird, Jr. 's duty 
in the United States Navy is not such as would materially 
effect his conduct of his defense to this action and that he is 
re.presented by George. 1\1. Lanning·, an· attorney appointed 
by this CourL · · 
UP0N· CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, 'it is . AD-
JUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that the motion of 
the defendant, Edward R. Baird, tT r.., for a continuance of this 
cause until sixty days after his discharge from the service 
is denied, and this cause is set for hearing on Mar.ch 1st, 
19~5. · 
[lhe fQllowing is the ~emur.:r,er filed as of Marcli l, 19.45, 
by l~ave or the de~ree entered on the 30th day of March, in 
the year, 194~. 
Appointed counsel for responde.nt Edwa,rd R. Baird, Jr .. , 
demurs to the bill of complaint herein and for cause of de-
murrer says : 
. 1. The bill of eomplaint sl1ows Ol\ its face that 
page 35 ~ complainant Nelle S. Tyler ~s not a member·. of 
· White Marsh Club, and because she is not a mem-
ber she has no rigilit to maintain a suit far the dissolution of 
the club. ~ · 
2. There are two members and directors of White March 
club~omplainant G. Ser.pell and respondent Edward R. 
Edwara Ri Bair~ Jr., v. Nelle Et T-yl'er-, ~t al. .i·s 
Ilaird, Jr. The death of the oth~r member and director-· S. 
1:[{)th __ Tyler-did n~t and doe1;1 not ipsQ. facto defeat th,e cor .. 
pt>rhte ptirp"oses, wliich :are still possible and sus·eep·t~ble of 
a'ccbmpli'smrrent ana enjoym~t by the te:rffahiing members 
a.':ri'd/or su~h oth~r m:ember or m~mbers as. may be eleet~a~ to 
~~b'~eed th~. ~a~~ ·s~ . H~th 1)r!ert o~ offi.er~i~e) in_ accor~an~~ 
with lh'e by:4aws, copy ijf p~rtment -provisions of which 1s 
hereto attaiched as part hereof; 
WHEREFORE, appointed counsel £or said 1'esppndent 
Edward R. Baird, Jr. prays.that the bill of complaint be hence 
dismissed with his reasonable eosts .in this behalf expended. 
George M. Lannihg Appointe.d Counsel for Respondent, 
BY-U\i\TS-. 
S~cU'd'1i 1. 
BO.A.RD OF DIR:tndTORS :' The B<>ard of Dir~ch:frs shall 
cbtisist bf not lMs tlian tliree hdr more than t-en members who 
shall discharge all the ~tities tlporl. them cievolvf?d By Ia*, aird 
do a~d ~x~cute all niaW~J.'S and thblgs for t}lc. prbp~~. tran~ .. 
iiutioii ljf th~ busihess of the ·ctirporation. Its tneinl1ers sliall 
. b~ elect~d by a. nuijority of_ tlie ni'erilbers of th~ ~bib havirig 
votin~ Jidwer. The votes 0.f the majority of the ~oara pres--
~iit at any iiie~tihg tluly called arid held shall' express the d~ .. 
· tertninatitin 6f tlie Board, provided, however, tliat a majority 
of the members of said Board shall constitute n quorum. 
page 36 } Hectio"n 2, 
OFFICERS: The officers of the corp_oration shall consist 
of~ Pr~sid~nt; Vice-President, Secr~taff an~ Treastj1~~r; ahcl 
~tic_h .ti.the! o~eer~ as ~~t ~r~D?- fi..me to. ~iili~., b~ c~P;nte~ ~#~ 
seleete~. ~y t~~. ~C?a.r~ <?f lli:~et~.~-s~ .. Th~ offi~es o! :V.~~~-fr.~~-
dent anti 1'reasurer or V1ce:Pres1dent and Secretary and 
· Secreta~y and Treasurer ..may be held by the same individual. 
Sectioti 1. ' . ! 
TERMS OF OFFICE: The officers and board bf cli.re'ctors 
s.hall hold office for one year from t}?,eir election unless sooner 
removed by the meml>iji:~; iifia tmti-1 t'Heit succ~ss·ors are 
ri1:tii1 zt~s~:::: or ~t:tt?'i:!trd lUM:lt;abit it,t1 
of Directors. 
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Section . .s. 
MEETINGS OF TH:in BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Meet-
ings of the Board of Directors· shall be held at any time and 
place determined by the Board of Directors or designated. by. 
the President. There shaU be one regular annual . meeting 
after the annual meeting of tl}e members of the club, and such 
other meetings as the Board, the President or the members 
may determine and direct. 
Section 9. 
MEMBERSHIPS: There shall he a regular Class A mem-
bership and such other classes of memberships as the Board 
of Directors may from time to time determine and design_ate. 
Election of members, initiation fees and dues shall be fixed 
and reg·ulated by the Board of 'Dirertors from time to time 
as it may se_e fit under conditions then existing. No person 
, shall be elected. to :membership, however, over the 
page 37 f negative votes of two members of the Board of 
Directors. Holders of regular Class A Member-
ships~ and such other membership as the Board of Directors 
may hereafter determine, shall be entitled to one vote each 
and may transfer or othenyise dispose of their membership 
only to a person who has been duly and regularlv elected to 
membership in the Club, and membership certificates shall 
state this plainly on their face. 
Section 11. 
BY-LAWS: These by-laws may l)e altered, repealed or 
f:!Upplemented at any time by a majority vote of the Board of 
Directors, or by a two-thirds vote of the members of the C~ub 
l1aving voting power at a meeting duly called and held. 
The following is the Answer filed as of :March l, 1945, of 
respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr. with attached exhibit filed 
by leave of the decree entered on the 30th day of March, in 
the year, 1~45. . · -
The answer of George M. Lanning as the counsel appointed 
l)y this Court to represent respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr., 
a person in the military service, alleges and. represents on: 
information and belief: 
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1. That the allegations contained in paragraphs -one, two· 
and four of the bill of complaint herein are correct. , 
2. That the'" allegations contained in paragraph three of 
said bill of complaint are incorrect in this respect: Edward R .. 
Baird was not a member of and had no interest·in· 
page 38 } the White Marsh Club at the time. of his death on 
December 11, 1940. He hacl previously made ·a 
gift of his interest therein to his son respondent Edward R. 
Baird, Jr. This took place shortly after incorporation of the 
club and he did not thereafter participate in any way in its. 
a ff airs. There was no .formal transfer of membership be-. 
cause no certificates of _membership were ~t any time issued 
to anyone by the company. 'The transfer1 .however, and as-
sumption of membership by Edward R. Baird, Jr. ,vas wade 
with the ·full knowledge and approval of S. Heth Tyler and 
G. SerpeH, as appears from the minutes of the members and 
directors meeting of September 16, 1942, copy of which is. 
hereto attached as "exhibit A". . · 
3. That paragraph five of the bill of .complaint is denied. 
There has not been a failure of corporate purposes either in 
fact or in law. On the contrary, the White Marsh Club is 
continuing, even during the pendency of this litigation, to 
operate in the same manner as it has done since the inception. 
of the corporation. The quantity of game (waterfowl) has 
increased from an ·estimate of 35,000,000 when the club was 
formed in 1937, to an estimated 150,000,000 today. Likewise, 
the hunting season 'has been-. extended from 30 days in' 1937 
to 80 days in 1944-45. · The shooting available at the club 
has correspondingly improved, with the exception of the sea-
son just closed. There has never been the slightest assertion 
or contention that there was a dissolution or failure of cor-
porate purposes either after the death of Edward R. Baird in 
1940, or after the death of S. Heth Tyler· in 1943., until shortly 
before this suit was brought in 1944. It was then advanced, 
not as the reason for a previously demanded sale of the club's 
properties, but as a g-ro1md for commencing suit -
page 39 ~ if sale was not consented to by respondent. Less 
than two months before the institution of this suit 
all parties interested in the club were actively laying plans 
for the coming hunting season. These parties included com-
plainant Serpell and his present counsel J. Hoge Tyler. The 
said Tyler had participated in the .club as a member on his 
father's share both before and after the latter's death. The 
purchase of a boat engine, and tl1e hiring of a guide for the 
season, were discussed with respondent. .Another plan in-
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vol"'ed using a retriever dog, whfo.h had re'cently be'en gi.~n 
to the club '.J)y a Naval officer a1cquainted with respondent. 
Howe-ve:r, an· alleged misu;n:deistanding ar.ose .. over the dog, 
and exa-ctly-,oile week l~ter respond·ent was called on the tele-
phon~ and s·ummarily requested to consent to a public auction 
of the club's properties, with the threat injected that if J:ie 
were "adamant" in his refusal to do so; a suit would be 
brt>light for the purpose of forcing a sale. Consequently; re-
spondent a\ter.s that the. allegation as to failure of corporate 
purposes is a subterfug·e and afterthoug1ht, the real purpose 
of the proceeding being an attempt to gain complete owner-
. ship of the club thr~ugh the medh1m of .a technical dissolution 
and sale of assets. 
4. That complainant Serpe.11 has no intention of parting 
with the property is further d~mtmstrated by the discussion 
with respondent just prior to the suit relative to a partition 
or division among the three interested parties; and . their 
repeated refusal to name a price for their two~thirds iI1ter.., 
est. It is alleged that the properties are cl~arly f:iusceptible 
to partition in kind and· that., if illiything, they 
page 40 ~ should be divided or partitioned among the three 
- interested parties, r3:thet than sold. The club con;., 
sists of four islands, a marsh. boathouse and clubhoilse. In 
addition, complainant Serpell personally controls another 
ialand, owned by· a non-resident ·m~mber of the predecessor 
corporation to this club, .which has long· been used by the mem~ 
hers as if it were club property. Two of the club's islands 
are at present far superior to the ()thers as shooting poiiits* 
and the only real disagreement lies in complainants' unwill .. 
ingness to consider any division that would entail their part~ 
ing with either of these particular islands. Respondent has 
already expressed his disinterestedness in the clubhffl:!se and 
boathottse1 for pnrposes of an amicable partition; but be 
would not agree to give tip both of the best shooting poirt.ts 
as well. · 
.And now, having fully answered, appointed couns~l for r.e~ 
spondent prays that the bill 0-f eomplainant be hence dis-
missed, with his reasonable cdsts in this hebalf expended, 
GEORGE M. LANJ,TJ:NG · ...._ 
Appointed Co1nisel for Respondent 
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EXHIBIT ''A', 
The annual meeting of the members and directors of White 
Marsh Club was held this 16tJ1 day of SeptP-niber, 1942, in tha · 
law office of ::M:ann & Tyler, Citizens Bank Building, Norfolk, 
Virginia. There were present all of the members and direc-
tors of the Club, to-wit: Goldsborough Serpell, S. Heth 
Tyler and Edwa!d R. Baird, Jr. Mr. Serpell acted as Chair-
man and Mr. :Baird as Secret_ary of the meeting. 
The following· were duly notni!lated and eler.te~ · 
page 41 ~ officers of the Club for the followmg year and until 
their successors are selected: 
Goldsboroug·h Serpell 
S. Heth Tyler 
Edward R. Baird, Jr . 
President 
Vice-President 
Secretary and Treasurer 
.After discussion it was on motion resolved that on account 
of the difficulty of securing ahnnal members to participate in 
. the cost of shooting, the Club not be operated and remain 
inactive for the 1942 hunting season. It was further resolved 
that if any arrangement could be made whereby the Club 
could deri\te or defray .the cost of maintenance for 1942, the 
President and Secretary were authorized to enter into it in 
their sole discretion without the necessity of having a further 
meeting of the members. 
The President and Secretary were directed to file with the . 
State Corporation Commission the annual report as required 
by law, and there· being no further business the meeting, on 
motion, adjourned. 
EDW AR.D R. BAIRD., '-TR. 
. Secretary 
G. SERPELL 
Chairman 
The f ollowin.g is the Amended and Supplemental answer 
filed as of March.1) 1945, of respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr. 
with attached exhibit filed by leave of the decree entered on 
tbe 30th day of March, in the year, 1946, 
page 42 ~ The amended and supplemental answer of 
George M .. Lanning as the counsel appointed by 
so Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
this court to represent respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr., a 
person in the military service, alleges and represents, in ad-
diti~n and supplement to the matters and things contained 
in his original answer, as follow~: · · 
1. That there are two members and directors of White 
Marsh Club-complainant G. Serpell and respondent Edwar~ 
R. Baird, Jr. The death of t~e oth~r member and director-
s. Heth Tyler-did not and does not ipso f aoto defeat the 
· corporate purposes, which are still possible and susceptible 
of accomplishment and enjoyment by the remaining members 
and/or such other member or members as may be ~lected to 
succeed the said S. Heth Tyler, or otherwise, in accordance 
with the by-laws, copy of pertinent provisions of which is 
hereto attached ~s part hereof marked ''exh~bjt B'~ 
And now, having fully answered, appointed counsel for re-
spondent prays that the bill of complaint be hence dismissed, 
with his reasonable costs in this behalf expended._ 
GEORGE M. LANNING 
Appointed Counsel for Respondent 
EXHIBIT ,cB'' 
BY-LAWS. 
Section 1. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS : The Board of Directors shall 
consist of not less than three nor more than ten members who 
shall discharge all the duties upon them devolved by law1 ancl 
do and execute all matters and things for the proper trans-
action of the business of tl1e corporation. Its members shall 
be elected by a majority of the members of the club 
page 43 ~ having voting power. The votes of the majority 
of the Board present at any meeting· duly called 
and held shall express the determination of the Board, pro· 
vided, however, that a majority of the members of said Board 
shall constitute a quorum. · 
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Section 2. 
OFFICERS: The officers of the corporation s1rall · consi'st 
of a President, Vice-President, Secretary and· Treasurer, and 
such other officers as may, from time to time( be created, and 
selected by the Board of Directors. The offices of Vice-Presi-
dent and Treasurer or Vice-President and Secretary and 
Secretary and Treasurer may be held by the same individual. 
SecJion '7.. 
TERMS OF OFFICE: The officers and board of directors 
shall hold office for one year from their election unless sooner 
removed by the members, : and until their successors are 
elected and qualified. Vacancy created by the death or resig-
nation of any officer or director shall be filled by the Board 
of Directors. 
Section 8. 
MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Meet-
ings of the Board of Directors shall be held at any time and 
place determined by the Board of Directors or designated 
by the President. There shall be one regular meeting annual. 
meeting after the annual meeting of the members of the club, 
and such other meetings as the '"'Board, the President or the 
members may determine and direct. 
Secfrion 9. 
page 44 } MEMBERSHIPS: There shall be a regular 
Class A membership and such other classes of 
memberships as the Board of Directors may from time to 
time determine and designate. Election of members, inltia.-
tion fees and dues shall be :fixed and regulated by the .Board 
of Directors from time to tim·e as it may see fit under condi-
tions then existing·. · No person shall be elected to 
membership., however, over the negative votes of two mem-
bers of the Board of Directors. Holders of regular Class 
A Memberships, and such other memb_erships as the· Board 
of Directors may hereafter determine, shall be entitled to one 
vote each and may transfer or otherwise dispose of their 
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memberships· onJy to a person· who has been duly and regu-
larly elected to membership in the Club, and membership cer-
~ca~es shaj.l state this plainly on their face. 
Section 11. 
BY·LA WS: These by-laws may be altered, repealed or 
s~pplemented at any tim~ by a majority vote of the Board of 
Directors, or by a two-thuds vote of the members of the Club 
having voting power at a meeting duly called and I1eld. 
The following is the stipulation filed by leave of the decree 
entered on the 30th day of March, in the year, 1945. 
. . 
It is stipulated by and between the parties to 
page 45 ~ this cause and their respective counsel as f~llows t 
(1) That if Nelle S. Tyler were present and testifying, she 
would. testify that. she was not interested in shooting water-
fowl and that she desired the dissolution of the White Marsh 
Club. Objection by respondent as to admissibility on the fol-
lowing grounds : Complainant Tyler not being a member of 
the club, she has no right to vote, shoot o-r otherwise enjoy 
the privileges of membership; her interests and desires in 
the matter of shooting are therefore purely personal and 
irrelevant to the club and to this proceeding . 
. (2) That if Goldsborough Serpcll were present and testi-
fying, he would testify that due to disputes with Edward R. 
Baird, Jr.~ he does not desire to shoot waterfowl with tbe said 
Edward R. Baird, Jr. Objection by respondent as to ad_-
pussibility on the following grounds: such testimony is not 
tn furtherance of or pursuant to any allegation in the bill of 
complaint or any issue made up in this cause, is inconsistent 
-with the allegations of the bill of complaint, seeks to set up an 
entirely new and different cause of action, and is incompetent, 
irrelevant a.nd iqnnaterial. . 
(3) That if Edward R: Baird, tTr. were present and testi-
fying, he would testify to a11 of the facts, assertions, conclu-
sions and admission~ contained in his original and amended 
answers. 
(4) That the foregoing stipulation constitutes the sole evi-
dence introduced and attempted to be introduced in thi.s cause 
Edward R. Baird., Jr., v. Nelle S. Tyler, et al. 53 
on the hearing or hearings prior to decree of court entered 
this date. 
Executed at Norfolk this 30th day of March, ~945. 
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J. HOGE TYLER III 
Counsel for Complainants 
GEORGE l\L LANNING 
·counsel for Responclent Edward R. 
R. Baird., lr. 
And now, at this day to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 30th day of March, in the year, 1945, the day and 
year first hereinabove written: 
This cause came on this day to be again heard on the papers 
formerly read and on the bill of complaint, the demurrer and 
the answer and amended answer· filed by George :M:. Lanning 
as the appointed counsel for the respondent Edward R. Baird, 
Jr., on March 1st, 1945, by leave of Court for good cause 
shown and on the written stipulation of the parties this day 
made and filed herein; and the cause was argued by counsel 
f'or complainants and Edward R. Baird, Jr. on his own behalf. 
And an amendment to paragraph 5 of the bill of complaint 
was tendered by counsel but, upon objection by respondent 
to its being allowed, was withdrawn and not filed. 
It appearing to the Court that in as much as Nelle S. Tyler 
had inherited and was devised the interest. of S. Heth Tyler 
in the White Marsh Club and she is not interested in carrv-
ing out the original purposes for whic.h this club was formed, 
and because of disputes between Edward R. Baird, Jr. and 
Goldsborough Serpell, the remaining two members, it is im-
possible that the original purpose for wl1ich this 
page 47 ~ club was formed to be consummated or carried 
out, and that therefore the purpose for which the 
White Marsh Club was incorporated has failed, and it ap-
pearing that it is th~ desire of the complainants that the cor-
poration be dissolved and that its assets be distributed to 
those entitled thereto: 
On consideration whereof, it is adjudged, ordered and de-
creed that the demurrer and objections to the evidence be 
overruled, that the ,Vhite Marsh Club be and hereby is de-
si Sttpteiiie Ootltt · tlf Apj_jeai§ ·Hf Virglliift 
elated dissolved; aiid J. Hoge Tyl~ri III ttna Ge6rg@ M. ta:11~ 
ning are appointed Commissioners of sale to make sale tif the 
assets of the White Marsh Club enumerated in the bill. The 
said Spe~ial Commissioners. shall . offer said assets for sale 
as a whole., i or cash, at ptib1ic auction. :llefore ei:eciltiiig this 
decree, however, the Special C.ommi~sioners shall give notice 
of the time, place and te_r:tris of sa1e 'f?y publication in· a news-
paper publish~d iii .th~ Oity d_f Norfolk,_Virginia, once a week 
for four weeks arid tliev shall ex~duM fiond before th~ Olerk 
of this Coiirt with apptdvdd Mctitity in the penalty of $500.00 
conditi~ned on the faithful perfdrmance of their duties as 
Special Commissioners, and to acr.ount for and pay over 
as · tl;le eourt may direct, all money that may come into their 
hattds as sudh Cdmrhissioiiers; . 
To all of witlcll rulings arta jud~etlt of ;the Court tne fij::: 
spondent duly objected and exce.ptsa~ Atta said resptihd~f1t 
h&.ving expressed an intention to present to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals a petition for app~al frow thi~ d_ecree;_ it 
is ordered adjudged _and decreed~ tha,t execµtion Qf the judg:; 
ment .herein provided for bef a~d it i_s her~P¥; su~~ 
page 48 ~ pendetl for a period of siity days fro.m t;he dat~ 
hereof and thereafter until said petition is .. act~d 
upon by the Supreme Court of Appeals. if said petitio~, is 
filed within the required time; upon the filing of a suspending 
btmd i:h the penalty of $500.00. . . . . · 
And it further appearing tha_t respondents Virgh!ia ;13_~\rd 
Tayloe and Kathedne B. Segar ;have no intere~t in the_ White 
Marsh Club., tlie bill of cemplaint is- hereby dismissed as to 
them, with costs. 
The following is Motion and Stipuiatiort flied the 17th day 
of-April, in the year, 1945. 
Please take notice tliat oh the 17th day of ~pt:ilf i94:$, th~ 
tt:ildersighed will malrn application to the Cl~rk of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk for a transcript of the recQ.rd 
in the above entitled cause for the purposes 9f a petition for 
appeal to the Stiprenic Court of Appeals from the deerea 
entered on March 80, 1945. 
GEORGE M. LANNING 
Appointed Counsel for respondent, 
Edward R.. Baitd, Jr. · 
• 
Eih¥aftl Ii. Biiird; Jr:fv. Nella ~:I: 'Fyl@i; M ·al. s~ 
. S@rviee af ilit! fbr~goiiig .1idti~e &ce@pted aiitl eopy te~@ived 
tills 17th fl§.y df Apfil; i9£.tfo -
;t ... 0Giu TYtE!t :rtl . 
!ounsel for Gomp1ainants· 
. · rt is stii:Uilated ttlifl agteed By arld batWMii the 
_ pftt'3 49 ~ uiider~igii~d tliat fdr tha v.iirpds~s- M a betitjon f6r-
. appett1 ttJ ,th~ Su:tJtenH~ Oourt tJf .App6itls by :ma~-
warfl :rt Bairo, J t. the ~fitt~n tfitns~rifjt io lie pr~flar@a of 
tlle t1Ierk. slHm ebnsist of : 
(1) Bill of complaint and attached exhibit. 
(2) Joint and several answer and mqtie.P. .of° respondents 
Tayloe and Segar for stay with attached affidavit. 
(3) ..Mn~avit_of .Nells .S. Tyler. 
(4) Order of November 29, 1944., appointing counsel for 
respondent in military service. . ... ·-- ~ .. . .... _ 
(5) Affidavit of J. H. Tyler dated February 16, 1945. 
(6) Transcript of statement ef Edward R. ·Baird, Jr. Feh-
ruary 21, 1945, on motion. · 
(7) Order of F~)jru}lry 21, 1945, overruling motion for stay 
and setting cause for hearing on March 1. 
(8) Demurrer of respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr. 
(9) Answer of respondent Edward R. Baird, Jr. with at-
tached exhibit. 
(10) Amended and supplemental answer of respondent Ed-
ward R. Baird, Jr. with attached ·exhibit. 
(11) Stipulation of counsel dated March 30, 1945. 
(12) Final decree entered March 30, 1945. 
(13) This notice and stipulation. 
(14) Clerk's certificate. 
J. HOGE TYLER III 
Counsel for Complainants 
GEORGEM.LANNING 
Appointed Counsel for respondent, 
Edward R. Baird, Jr. 
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In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 19th day of April, in the year,·1945. 
• 
56 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
I, W. R. Hanckel, Clerk of the aforesaid Court hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing transcript includes the papers filed 
~nd the proceedings had thereon in the chancery cause of 
Nelle S. Tyler and Goldsborough Serpell, Complainants, v. 
White Marsh Club, a non-stock C(?rporation, Edward R. 
Baird., Jr., 'Virginia Baird Tayloe and Katherine B. Segar, 
Defendants, lately pending in our said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the defendants hacl received due 
notice in writing thereof and of the intention of the said 
complainants to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of -
Virginia Jor an appeal from the decree of said Court entered 
herein by 'said Court on the 30th day of March, in the year, 
1945. 
Teste: 
W. R. HA.NCKEL, Clerk. 
Fee for Transcript $26.50. 
A. Copy-Teste: 
M. B. W .ATTS, C. C. 
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